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Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) plays a critical role in data generation where a large
number of vehicles collect various kinds of sensing resources with large-volume features. The
resources are diversified according to various vehicle capabilities. While the information that
should be collected is essential for the success of VCC applications, how to stimulate the vehicle
owners to provide their sensing resources in VCC is also crucial to its success. When vehicle
owners choose to contribute their data for economically appealing compensation, they may be
concerned about their privacy.
This thesis first proposes a promising secure and privacy-preserving incentive mechanism
framework for VCC. An incentive to convince vehicle owners with excess on-board capabilities
to join in VCC without the risk of privacy disclosure. The incentive mechanism employs game
theory to model the interactions between the VCC server and vehicles. With the incentive mech-
anism, the VCC server, which represents the task announcement can select competent vehicles
to collaborate for the announced task, and the vehicle owners can earn payments from their par-
ticipation. Further, the incentive mechanism guarantees the fairness between all participants in
terms of payment. This is because the critical payment scheme can ensure the truthfulness of all
the participants such that each vehicle honestly reports its true sensing cost. The signcryption
technique and homomorphic concept are exploited to achieve mutual authentication between the
VCC server and vehicles, and prevent the privacy information of these vehicles from being dis-
closed. Simulation results are provided to show that the privacy-preserving incentive mechanism
is beneficial to both the VCC server and vehicles to achieve a win-win situation.
Moreover, we study the situation in which the VCC server announces a spatial task that can
be exploited by an adversary or malicious Roadside unit (RSU) to reveal vehicles’ privacy. Pro-
tecting the privacy of participants becomes an essential to the prosperity of the VCC applications.
Therefore, we propose a novel secure and privacy-preserving scheme for enhancing security in
VCC-based tasks announcement. The proposed scheme combines a multiple receiver signcryp-
tion technique with proxy re-encryption in order to protect message content that includes the
private information of the vehicles from being disclosed during task announcement. The scheme
can achieve data confidentiality and integrity against the malicious RSU, which means that the
RSU is not able to access private information or corrupt the task announcement during the recruit-
ing process. The distinctive feature of the proposed scheme eliminates the issue of increasing
the computation delay that most of the multiple receiver signcryption schemes are suffering from
when the number of receivers increases. Compared to the other multiple receiver signcryption
iii
schemes, the proposed scheme is more efficient in regards to computational overhead and ci-
phertext size. Additionally, security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme is resilient
against various security threats to VCCs.
In addition to the above schemes, the quality of task fulfillment strongly depends on the set
of recruited vehicles. The more suitable participants are involved, the better the obtained results
are. However, at the same time the more privacy is threatened for violating. Due to the fact that a
VCC server is responsible for recruiting vehicles to collaborate for the announced task, the VCC
server may not be fully trusted, and the disclosure of individual locations has serious privacy im-
plications from the perspective of vehicles. It is possible for attackers to predict the trajectory and
living habit of a specific vehicle. Thus, we introduce a novel framework for privacy-preserving
for a location privacy-aware task recommendation framework in spatial crowdsourcing. The pro-
posed framework enables a VCC server to recommend spatial tasks released by customers to the
participants in geocast regions. By exploiting Lagrange interpolating polynomials, we design
a privacy-preserving location matching mechanism, called LATE, to enable the VCC server to
determine whether the interested vehicle participant is in a geocast region of a spatial task or not
without having any knowledge about the task’s geocast regions and the vehicle’s location. In
addition, the contents of spatial tasks and vehicles’ reports are protected from privacy leakage
for both customers and participants. The proposed scheme demonstrates the efficiency and prac-
ticality for recommending spatial tasks to suitable vehicles while protecting vehicles’ privacy.
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As of late, automotive manufacturers try to promote their vehicles by equipping them with a
set of sensing devices, wireless communication devices and powerful On-board units (OBUs)
with high computing and storage capabilities, aiming to guarantee on-road safety and to improve
on-board experiences [80]. With this sophisticated equipment, vehicles can be considered as
mobile resources for many services such as computing, storage and sensing [1]. Therefore, S.
Abdelhamid et al. [2], introduced the concept of Vehicle as a Resource (VaaR), which focus on
making use of various vehicular resources to generate a large number of data that can be extended
to support more applications, such as vehicle fault diagnostics, vehicle noise pollution detection,
and air quality forecasts.
While these vehicles can act as perfect candidates to utilize on-demand resources as services,
studies show that the resources of these intelligent vehicles are not completely invested and most
of these resources are wasted. In order to explore and utilize the excess vehicle’s capabilities,
Olariu et al. [59] introduced the concept of Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC), which is an
emerging paradigm that integrates Vehicle Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) and cloud computing to
provide cloud based services for the drivers. The key point of the VCC paradigm is to collect and
utilize the excessive vehicles’ resources in a dynamic group of vehicles under the vehicle owners’
authorization. By using the vehicles’ resources, the VCC becomes increasingly ideal and hence
it can support many applications such as safety-related and non-safety-related applications.
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It is important to know that these applications can support drivers by using mobile crowd-
sensing paradigms in which individuals are able to collect and contribute data using sensing and
computing mobile devices (i.e., smartphones). However, mobile devices suffer from sensor limi-
tations, which are insufficient for providing valuable data for different applications. For example,
consider the following two scenarios:
• Scenario 1: Safety-related applications, which contribute to improving road safety. No-
tifying road surface hazards such as ice, nails, and potholes to the drivers will improve
their on-road safety. Currently, most safety-related road providers rely on mobile devices
such as smartphones to obtain road information. However, the data obtained from mobile
device sensors are not accurate enough to estimate the road condition because of their lim-
itations [75]. As Fig. 1.1(a) shows, if a road is suspected to have nails, mobile devices can
hardly detect the existence of these potential hazards. However, using vehicular sensors
can be distinguished from other mobile devices [1]. For example, once a vehicle’s tire is
punctured by nails, the Tire Pressure Monitoring Sensors (TPMSs) can perceive the loss
of air immediately. The development of vehicle sensors that can detect road surface ab-
normalities and obtain real-time road information are continuously increasing. As part of
the VCC system, the affected vehicle can distribute road abnormalities to all the connected
vehicles and the cloud server. Thus, the hazards can be either avoided or cleared quickly,
which can benefit the whole community.
• Scenario 2: Non-safety-related applications, which are used to facilitate traffic manage-
ment. Providing real-time traffic information is essential for maintaining an agile traffic
status by detouring vehicles away from congested roads. Knowing what is currently occur-
ring on the roads, the drivers can decide to make their journeys much easier. Now, more
and more vehicles are equipped with real-time traffic service from satellite or connected
mobile devices. With real-time traffic, the drivers can choose the optimal route to avoid
the delay. Also, in-car sensors can provide more accurate information compared with reg-
ular mobile devices. Here, we use Google maps as an example to show the limitations
of mobile devices. As shown in Fig. 1.1(b), we can see that the road in red in Google
maps indicates a traffic jam in a certain area. In fact, the jam is located in the left lane,
which means that the road is only partially congested. Providing this type of inaccurate
traffic information can easily mislead the drivers who intend to go straight. Nevertheless,
the signal light sensor inside a vehicle can easily detect the vehicle’s exact direction at an
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intersection. It can be seen that the data collected by a vehicle’s built-in sensors is always


























Figure 1.1: Application Scenarios of Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC).
Thus, the VCC can benefit from the capabilities of individual vehicles and utilize them to
provide more accurate and useful services compared with other mobile crowdsensing paradigms.
As illustrated in Fig. 1.2, the VCC consists of three layers, the vehicles layer, communication
layer and cloud layer. In the cloud layer, the customers outsource their tasks to the cloud. The
cloud then releases the tasks to the Roadside unit (RSU) nodes located in the sensing areas. In
the communication layer, the RSU is responsible for broadcasting the announcement tasks and
returning the results to the cloud if the data requirements are met. In the vehicle layer, a number
of connected in-motion vehicles cooperate with each other to achieve practical applications.
Nevertheless, adequate vehicle participation is considered a significant part of the success of
VCC applications. A number of VCC applications have been proposed based on the assumption
of making vehicles voluntarily contribute to the VCCs. However, there still exist several chal-
lenges that may affect the development of the VCC applications. The first challenge is whether
the owners of smart vehicles are willing to participate in a VCC system. This is because when
vehicles provide their resources to the VCC, they incur some costs. As a result, the vehicle
owners may refuse to participate unless they receive incentives such as compensation for their
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resources [4]. Although the authors in [5] claim that the owner of a vehicle may intend to rent
out its on-board resources with economically appealing compensation, the issue to be solved is
determining how to stimulate vehicle owners to provide on-demand services in a dynamically
changing environment. Furthermore, consideration must be made to determine how to select
optimal vehicles and their strategies while guaranteeing fairness. The second challenge is the
security and privacy-preservation issues of the involved vehicles in VCC [87]. Since the service
providing vehicles are independently owned, one vehicle may not trust the messages transmitted
from other vehicles unless it verifies the origin of the messages. While at the same time, the ve-
hicle owners may be concerned about the privacy of their information disclosed such as location
and identity during participation in VCC. Thus, the vehicle owners may choose not to contribute
to the VCC without the protection of the private data being guaranteed. Moreover, the incentive
mechanism should also protect the payment information related to the participating vehicles.
To solve the above challenges, many works have been done that use game theory, such as
Stackelberg, were used to encourage vehicle owners to participate by sharing their resources in
a VCC system [20] [91] [92]. However, these works did not adequately consider the problem
of how to protect the privacy of the involved vehicles and how to evaluate vehicles’ resources
in terms of payment. For instance, these schemes provide fixed monetary rewards for each task
which is not adequate to guarantee the fairness and correctness among vehicles. The vehicle
that provides sensing resources will obtain the same compensation as those who provide com-
puting or storage resources. It is important to know that the sensing resource is totally different
from the computing and storage resources in terms of social cost. Vehicle owners may seek to
maximize their profits by providing a different type of resources; therefore, we cannot merely
compensate the vehicle that provides sensing resources the same as those who provide comput-
ing or storage resources. This encourages us to display a mechanism that is capable of evaluating
vehicles’ resources in an obvious way in order to guarantee the fairness and correctness between
the vehicles.
Nevertheless, we still need to overcome several challenges. The first challenge is how to
design a framework that is resilient to strategic users. This results in the second challenge in
how carefully setting an appropriate mechanism to attract users into the VCC environment. The
third challenge is how to design a lightweight privacy-preserving protocol to protect the privacy
of each participating vehicle.
Therefore, the main motivation of this study is to propose a new framework for a privacy-
preserving incentive mechanism in VCC. The mechanism will stimulate the vehicles to provide
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on-demand services in a dynamically changing environment in VCC without the risk of pri-
vacy disclosure. The proposed scheme uses game theory (i.e., auction game) as the basis of
incentive mechanism to model the interactions between the VCC server and vehicles. The pro-
posed scheme exploits cryptographic techniques such as the signcryption technique, in addition
to homomorphic and bilinear pairing as the basis of the privacy-preserving scheme. Thus, the
proposed scheme aids in stimulating vehicle owners while simultaneously satisfying security and
privacy requirements in VCC.
Figure 1.2: Vehicular Cloud.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
The objective of this research is to design a secure and privacy-preserving incentive framework
for VCC. This will include a privacy-preserving and truthful tendering scheme aiming to get
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vehicle owners to participate by pooling their collected resources in the VCC system without
the risk of privacy disclosure. Furthermore, a secure and privacy-preserving task announcement
scheme is proposed based on the multiple signcryption and proxy re-encryption technique in
order to achieve data confidentiality and integrity for task announcements in VCC. Location
privacy-aware task recommendation based on Lagrange interpolating polynomials is proposed to
enable a VCC server to recommend spatial tasks released by customers to the vehicles in geocast
regions without disclosing vehicles’ privacy. To be more specific, the main contributions of this
thesis includes:
• By exploiting game theory, a tendering-based incentive framework is proposed to stimu-
late vehicle owners with excess on-board capabilities to join in announced tasks in VCC. A
vehicle can generate a large variety of data from the sensor devices and store them until the
vehicle is selected by a VCC server as a resource provider. Based on this, we design an il-
lustrative language that is capable of describing heterogeneous vehicular resource types as
a novel approach to guarantee the fairness and correctness amongst vehicles. In addition,
we introduce a Truthful Privacy Preserving Tendering (TPPT) mechanism that ensures
truthful tenders and helps a VCC server to select the vehicle with optimal parameter for the
task. The proposed framework makes use of the signcryption technique with a homomor-
phic concept in order to preserve the truthful information reported by vehicles from being
disclosed. Compared with popular game theory schemes applied in VCC [20] [91] [92],
the proposed TPPT is much more efficient and guarantees the truthful tenders. Moreover,
a detailed performance analysis demonstrates that the privacy-preserving scheme is indeed
significantly more efficient than the existing schemes [33] [68] in terms of both communi-
cation and computational overheads.
• By considering vehicles’ location privacy may be disclosed during a task announcement,
we propose a new efficient Multiple Receiver Proxy Re-Signcryption scheme (MRPRS).
The proposed scheme combines signcryption and proxy re-encryption techniques. MRPRS
scheme is able to eliminate the issue of increased computation delay that most multiple re-
ceiver signcryption schemes are suffering from, especially when the number of receivers
becomes larger. Therefore, we use the proposed MRPRS as a concealing technique to
prevent the vehicles’ privacy from being disclosed during task announcements. MRPRS
shows the efficiency in terms of computational costs and ciphertext size compared to exist-
ing multiple receiver signcryption schemes [83] [61] [98] and proxy re-encryption schemes
in [49] [72] [45].
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• The prosperity of the VCC applications are inspired by the facts that the quality of task ful-
fillment strongly depends on the set of recruited vehicles. However, the privacy of vehicles
will be at risk of being disclosed when the VCC server recommends some of the suitable
vehicles to engage in the task. Thus, we design a privacy-preserving location matching
mechanism using Lagrange interpolating polynomials. The geocast region of the spatial
task is encrypted using a temperate public key and a searchable tag is generated from the
worker’s location and the corresponding temperate secret key. Having the ciphertext and
tag, anyone can test whether the worker’s location is one of the places in the geocast region.
By leveraging the designed privacy-preserving location mechanism, we propose a novel lo-
cation privacy-aware task recommendation framework (LATE) in spatial crowdsourcing,
which enables the VCC server to recommend spatial tasks released by customers to the
vehicles in geocast regions. The VCC server cannot know the geocast regions of the spa-
tial tasks and geographic locations of vehicles, but must be able to determine whether the
vehicles are located in the geocast regions of spatial tasks. Therefore, the VCC server can
recommend the spatial tasks to the vehicles for fulfillment. In addition, we utilize proxy
re-encryption to encrypt the spatial tasks and vehicle reports to prevent privacy leakage.
We prove the security of LATE to show that no attacker can learn anything about the loca-
tions of workers and the geocast areas of spatial tasks, and we demonstrate that LATE is
efficient and practical in terms of computational and communication overhead.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces an overview of vehicular
cloud, architecture, security and privacy issues, applied cryptography to VCC, selfish vehicle
issues, applied game theory, and related work. In chapter 3, we present a framework for privacy-
preserving and truthful tendering in a vehicular cloud computing, followed by security analysis
and evaluation. Chapter 4 discusses a secure and privacy-preserving task announcement scheme
against malicious gateways in vehicular cloud computing and provides a security analysis and
performance evaluation. Chapter 5 introduces location privacy-aware task recommendations for
spatial crowdsourcing based on Lagrange interpolating polynomials. Finally, in chapter 6 will




2.1 An Overview of Vehicular Cloud Computing
Currently, the automotive industry is focusing on vehicular components and their relevant ap-
plications, which will classify them as intelligent vehicles. Such components include a number
of sensor devices, wireless communication, and OBU for storage and operation control. With
these components, a vehicle can be considered a mobile resource for many services such as
sensing, storage, and computing resources. The computing resource is considered as a powerful
computer, which handles computing tasks in a manner similar to a typical personal computer
(PC), such as those in with dual core processors up to 2.8 GHz and storage capabilities in gi-
gabytes [2]. Typically, storage and computing resources are tightly linked as both are provided
by the OBU device that these vehicles are equipped with. Additionally, the OBU provides a
broadband wireless communication that enables data transfer through 3G or 4G cellular commu-
nication systems, Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE), Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC), WiFi, and WiMAX [2]. As a result, the smart vehicle, whether parked
or driving on the road, forms part of a distributed system that potentially helps with management
of computing tasks in an efficient and cost-effective manner in contrast to centralized systems that
offer the same. In contrast, the sensing resources help to improve a vehicle performance and en-
hance the driving experience through monitoring its operations and the status of its parts. Where
the average number of sensor devices that have been added to the vehicle can be reach to 100
sensors for supporting its operation and enhancing vehicle’s services [26]. With the abundance
of sensor devices, a vehicle can be considered a significant sensory resource that is impossible to
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be equipped with a single sensory device. For instance, plenty of resources distinguish the use
of a modern vehicle as a resource from other mobile resource providers such as smartphones,
which they suffer from the limited resources and lack of a trajectory prediction. Modern vehi-
cles are considered as perfect candidates to work together with the cloud and offer a number of
on-demand services.
Hence, some researchers have focused on VCC in order to utilize the extra resources of the
vehicles [59] [60]. VCC is an emergent model that shifts away from the conventional VANET to
a cloud service. The ultimate goals of VCC are to provide services to the vehicle drivers in real
time with very little energy [29].
2.2 Vehicular Cloud Computing Architecture
Several VCC architectures have been proposed and considered by the researchers [41] [39]. Most
of them have some similar components and organizations. In this chapter, we present a general
VCC system architecture.
2.2.1 VCC system architecture
A typical VCC framework extends the traditional cloud infrastructure concept by integrating a
VANET communication to provide services with real time information. It is mainly composed
of vehicles, RSUs and a cloud server.
• Vehicle: Most vehicles are smart vehicles that equip themselves with various sensors, a
powerful OBU along with communication capabilities. Consequently, the vehicles are
able to collect all kinds of data from onboard sensors, and share them with the connected
vehicles or the cloud server.
• RSU: The RSU usually acts as a stationary member, which is a bridge between the ve-
hicles and cloud server. Even without sufficient computing power, it can still make the
communication between the vehicles and cloud server much easier and trustful.
• Cloud server: The cloud server is a control center with powerful computational and stor-
age capabilities. It constitutes of a cloud infrastructure layer, cloud service layer and cloud
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applications layer [39]. The cloud infrastructure layer contains the cloud storage and com-
putation. This layer is responsible for aggregating computation, and vehicular storage as
well as the data that are involved in VCC. Generally, the cloud infrastructure layer sends




















Figure 2.1: Vehicle Cloud Architecture.
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As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, a cloud server, RSU nodes, and smart vehicles cooperate with each
other within the VCC system. The vehicles collect various information periodically or inciden-
tally from their onboard sensors during moving. The cloud server recruits vehicles to fulfill some
tasks with the data they collected along the road. Vehicles also connect with each other by differ-
ent communication modules that form a large vehicular network. In this network, vehicles with
high activity level means a large amount of communications, which in turn have more chances
to be recruited as a task execution entity by the cloud server. During the process, the RSU helps
make the data transmission smoother between the cloud server and vehicles. Based on the task,
vehicles send the related data to the cloud server via the RSU over wireless connections [39].
Apart from the vehicle-server communication, vehicles could also choose to request the data
they need from the connected vehicles through connection such as V2V communication [48].
2.3 Vehicular Cloud Computing Security and Privacy
The main purpose of developing VCC is to provide more information on road conditions with
the promise of making roads safer for vehicle drivers. However, to adopt the VCC system more
widely, we need to address several challenges in the real VCC applications. Amongst the top
challenges are security and privacy issues of the involved vehicles in VCC [87] [90]. This is
because in the VCC system, the authorized users as well as adversaries are located within the
same infrastructure and end up sharing the same privileges. Thus, when the data is uploaded to
the VCC server, the participating vehicles lose control over their collected data. Subsequently,
the adversaries can break into the system to further their malicious intentions, including access
to the confidential data or may even attempt to interfere with the integrity of data. Where the
forged reports may directly impact the results, and further mislead customers to make irrational
decisions. As a result, one vehicle may not trust the message transmitted from other vehicles in
a VCC environment, unless it verifies the origins of the message. In addition, to build successful
VCC applications, the VCC server should recruit a large number of vehicles to participate in
announcement tasks. However, the vehicle owners may be concerned about the privacy of their
information disclosed such as their locations and identities during participation in VCC. As a
result, the vehicle owners may refrain from participating to the VCC without obtaining a guaran-
tee for protecting their private data. Therefore, security is essential to the prosperity of the VCC
11
applications. Only a healthy and secure VCC environment can bring individuals more benefits
and attract more individuals to participate in VCC applications. The basic security requirements
for VCC related services include integrity, data confidentiality, authentication and protection of
privacy. These are discussed in a detail.
• Confidentiality: In VCC, the adversary or malicious RSU can easily reveal the sensitive
information from the message reports. Although the RSU is considered to be honest, it is
interested in the reports generated by vehicles. Therefore, consider the data that is gener-
ated by vehicles and which is forwarded to the VCC server via RSUs as facing the attack
of revealing the source of private information. For example, when a vehicle sends a road
event report to a cloud server, it may include some private information about the vehicle.
The malicious RSU can eavesdrop on all the data passed through it to the cloud server and
discloses the confidentiality of a message that may include a vehicle’s sensitive informa-
tion. Furthermore, the malicious RSU can infer secret information from the intersection of
multiple message reports such as the trajectory of a specific vehicle. Thus, the confiden-
tiality of vehicle’s reports is the primary objective to achieve. Data encryption can be used
to protect the sensitive information against curious attackers.
• Authentication and Integrity: Authentication and integrity are another critical aspect
related to the functionality of vehicles’ reports. If the vehicles’ reports are delivered by
an untrusted vehicle or compromised by a forged attack and send it to the VCC server,
it could lead to severe damages that cannot be recovered such as accidents or financial
damages. For example, although a vehicle is considered as an honest user to submit reports
for benefits, the malicious vehicle or RSU can modify any accident report message before
forwarding it to the VCC server in order to trick the VCC server into accepting false results.
As a result, when insurance companies seek accident reports, they may not be able to
reach the driver that caused the accident. Therefore, it is worthwhile to ensure that the
source of vehicles’ reports are fully trusted and behave honestly. In order to successfully
defend against forged data attacks, authentication and integrity should be guaranteed in
any vehicle’s report such as digital signatures and only the original messages from legal
members should be accepted.
• Privacy Protection: Identification and localization of vehicles are also a major challenge
to the privacy protection in the VCC system [89]. Due to the fact that multiple VCC
applications require a vehicle’s location and identity, they can be easily disclosed by an
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eavesdropper. The message that is sent by a vehicle to the VCC server devoid of content
oriented privacy may result for disclosing private information of the vehicle. For instance,
reporting sensing data from the surrounding environment may relate to some aspects of the
drivers or even passengers and their social setting. For example, where drivers are located,
heading, visit frequently, or which activity they prefer to do in vehicles. Thus, in order to
protect vehicle’s privacy, cryptography should be applied to important information.
2.4 Applied Cryptography to Vehicular Cloud
This section gives a brief overview of different common cryptography methods that are widely
used in many standards, technologies and academic works recommended for the VCC paradigm.
Superficially, the security and privacy issues in VCCs may look similar to those experienced
in other networks. However, the characteristic features of VCCs introduce many of the classic
security and privacy challenges. For example, the high mobility of vehicles is liable to cause
significant challenges in terms of managing authentication and protecting vehicles’ privacy dur-
ing transmission data in VCC. In this thesis, we take advantage of some specific cryptographic
techniques to ensure that the vehicle’s privacy and the transmitted data in a VCC system are se-
cure. In the following subsections, we will introduce the basic concepts of some cryptographic
techniques used in this study and they will be examined in more detail, several chapters later.
2.4.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptosystems
Cryptographic systems are operations employed to transform a plaintext to a ciphertext. It is
the processing method of the input data and the number of keys [77]. For instance, when the
same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the message, it is called symmetric cryptography and
when different keys are deployed for encryption and decryption it is referred to as a public key
or asymmetric cryptosystem. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these cryptosystems
are well studied in [53] and their key length, hash function, digital signature and computational
performance are compared with each other. In the VCC system, asymmetric and symmetric
encryption methods have not widely been used in the literature.
In this work, we adopt symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystem techniques to design a secure
and privacy-preserving scheme with a variety of security purposes.
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2.4.2 Signcryption Technique
A traditional approach to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity for each message is to dig-
itally sign a message followed by a public key encryption. This approach is referred to as a
sign-then-encrypt scheme. The cost involved in this approach is the sum of the cost involved
by signing the message added to the cost of encrypting it. The sender would sign the message
using an already chosen digital signature scheme and then encrypt the message using a public
key encryption scheme separately. One of the main disadvantages of the aforementioned algo-
rithm is that when the message is signed and then encrypted some extra bits are appended to the
transmitted data which causes more machine cycles. In addition, the computational complexity
to decrypt the received message is increased which in turn leads to higher costs of transferring
data using this approach [101].
Therefore, to tackle this problem, a new cryptographic concept termed signcryption was first
introduced by Zheng [101], which is considered as a promising paradigm in the public key cryp-
tography. In the signcryption technique both the digital signature and encryption are performed
concurrently in one step. Although the signcryption technique performs the signature and en-
cryption simultaneously, the computational costs and communication overhead are much lower
compared to the aforementioned algorithm [7]. Due to these advantages, several signcryption
schemes were proposed [93] [34] [33] [68].
2.4.3 Proxy Re-encryption Technique
A proxy re-encryption is a technique in which a proxy converts an encryption message under
Bob’s public-key into an encryption message purposed to Chris. The main concept of this tech-
nique is to allow Bob to reveal the contents of a message sent to him and encrypted with his
public key to Chris, without disclosing his private key to Chris, as shown in Fig. 2.2.
On the other hand, the proxy can convert an encryption message without knowing the secret
keys of Bob or Chris and does not learn the plaintext during the conversion [6]. The framework
of a proxy re-encryption technique is defined as the following:
• Key Generation. Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order q, and g be a generator of
G. Bob randomly chooses xb ∈ Z∗q as his private key skb and computes his public key as
pkb = g
xb . Similarly, Chris’s private key skc is xc ∈ Z∗q and the public key is pkc = gxc .
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• Encryption. The sender (Bob), selects r ∈ Z∗q randomly and encrypts the messagem using
his public key pkb and delegates Chris to decrypt the message as in the following formulas:
– CB = Encrypt(pkb,m).
– RkeyB→C = (skb, pkc).
Then, Bob sends the RkeyB→C , CB to the proxy.
• Proxy Re-encryption. When the proxy receives the encrypted message from Bob that
intends to Chris, it will re-encrypt the message using the RkeyB→C as in the following
formula:
– Cc = Re− encrypt(RkeyB→C , CB).
Then, the proxy sends the Cc to Chris.
• Decryption. The receiver (Chris) uses his private key skc to decrypt the ciphertext as in the
following formula:
– m = decrypt(skc, Cc).
Figure 2.2: Proxy Re-encryption Process.
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2.4.4 Homomorphic Encryption Technique
The homomorphic encryption technique has a unique feature that allows arithmetic computa-
tions to be carried out on an encrypted message to produce a new encrypted result, which when
decrypted, the result will give the same result when doing arithmetic on a plaintext [58]. More-
over, the homomorphic encryption technique can be used to facilitate the analysis and detecting
of the replicated data among the encrypted messages. For example, given n encrypted vehicles’
bidding values (b1, ..., bn), we can find a set of users that has the same report values while they
are encrypted.
These cryptography techniques that are discussed above are important to the current research.
In this work, we combine the signcryption technique and proxy re-encryption as well as a homo-
morphic concept to achieve an efficient privacy-preserving scheme in order to protect vehicles’
privacy from being disclosed.
2.5 Selfish Vehicle
Vehicles are considered as a perfect candidate to provide on-demand resources as services.
Hence, a number of VCC applications have been proposed, which are based on the assump-
tion that vehicles voluntarily contribute to the VCC. However, the participating vehicles may
incur some cost when they provide their resources to the VCC (e.g., bandwidth, storage, com-
puting and battery of vehicles and sacrifice partial privacy about drivers). As a result, the vehicle
owners may stop their participation until they obtain some incentives and compensation for their
resources [5]. These type of vehicles are called selfish nodes. The selfish nodes may create
challenges in development of the real VCC applications. The first challenge may result in the
question of how to stimulate vehicle owners to provide on-demand services in VCCs. The second
challenge is how to select the suitable vehicles with guaranteeing fairness. Thus, a well-designed
incentive mechanism that stimulates vehicles to participate with ensuring the fairness amongst
them is quite important.
In VANET, selfish nodes have received vast attention with incentive mechanisms being pro-
posed as the most viable way of keeping such selfish nodes to a minimum by encouraging contri-
bution [14] [16] [44]. It is important to note that although the schemes are beneficial to VANETs,
they are unsuitable to the VCC system. The basic motivation behind stimulation in VANETs is
to encourage vehicles to route and broadcast traffic related messages, which is fundamentally
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different from VCC. In this chapter, we will review some of the incentive mechanisms proposed
for minimizing selfish vehicles in the VCC that are related to our work.
2.6 Applied Game Theory to Vehicular Cloud
Game theory plays a critical role in modeling the interactions between groups of people. There
are two main branches of game theory: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Coopera-
tive game theory deals with groups of people as the unit of analysis, which requires a cooperation
among themselves to achieve certain goals. Non-cooperative game theory deals with how ratio-
nal individuals interact with one another in an effort to achieve their own goals. This type of
game theory is all about decision making within strategic settings. The user needs to consider
both preferences and rationality of others users in their decision to create the best outcome for
himself [30]. Thus, non-cooperative game theory is described by its players and a strategy profile
for each player. In this regard, a strategy profile is defined as a set of strategies for an individ-
ual player that holistically specifies all gaming actions. In non-cooperative game theory, one
player’s decision may affect another player’s payoff and hence every player tries to find the op-
timal strategy (Nash Equilibrium) to maximize his payoff. The Nash Equilibrium [54] is a term
used to describe an equilibrium where each player’s strategy is an optimal response to the antic-
ipated rational strategy of the other player(s). No player is able to improve their payoff through
alteration of its strategy. Based on this concept, many game theories exist such as Stackelberg
equilibrium [76].
Central to game theory’s application is the incentive mechanism, which is defined as some-
thing that triggers a particular course of action. The incentive mechanisms are important in
interactions that focus on the motivation of players to improve profitability and productivity, and
reduce absenteeism [36] [37] [50] [65]. For instance, consider two firms as a leader and a num-
ber of followers sharing bilateral interaction. When the leader offers an incentive for meeting a
specific goal, the followers are likely competing between each other and every follower tries to
find his best strategic action (Nash Equilibrium). The leader then selects one or a set of follow-
ers with optimal strategies as winners to achieve their goal. The incentive will be given to the
winning followers as a reward when the goal is met. The leader firm uses rewards as incentives
to stimulate desired behavior. Therefore, the incentive is a useful mechanism to induce a positive
attitude and motivate follower firms.
Due to the fact that vehicles are selfish and rational, which they are interested in maximizing
17
their profits, we refer to them as a non-cooperative game theory. Therefore, in this thesis, we
take advantage of some specific game theory models to design incentive mechanisms between
the VCC server and vehicles. While given the right incentives, vehicles may have the motivation
to contribute their under-utilized resources in VCC. Thus, both the VCC server and follower
vehicles can benefit from the task, and a win-win situation can be achieved. In the following
subsections, we will introduce some game theory techniques used in this study and they will be
examined in more detail in the following chapter.
2.6.1 Stackelberg Game Model
The Stackelberg model is considered a sequential game [78], where there are two firms that offer
homogeneous products and compete by choosing the quantity of output Q1 and Q2 to produce.
The firms are considered the leader and follower firms, where the leader has the power to decide
first the quantity of Q1 to sell and the follower firms can observe what the leader has decided for
Q1, and choose Q2 accordingly to maximize their profits. Leader firm always knows how the
follower firms will react to its decision. Thus, the equilibrium is reached when the leader and the
follower firms are aiming to maximize their profits. The leader firm moves first and produces a
large output of Q1, while the follower firms are forced to produce less output of Q2 [30].
2.6.2 Auction Game Model
In an auction system, the auctioneer announces the price for the object as long as two or more
bidders are willing to participate. The auction system will stop when there is only one bidder
giving a price that is higher than the other bidders. The design and analysis of auction systems
are one of the triumphs of game theory. This is because game theory has a strong mathematical
foundation that make it an essential tool for modeling and designing automated decision-making
processes in interactive environments. For example, one might like to design efficient bidding
rules for an auction website, or negotiation rules for purchasing communication bandwidth. The
first auction game theory was introduced by the economist William Vickrey in 1961 and practi-
cally used in the 1990s when auctions of radio frequency spectrum for mobile telecommunication
raised billions of dollars [35]. Afterward, many principles for sound bidding can be illustrated
by applying game-theoretic ideas to simple examples.
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In this work, we study the incentive game theory in terms of task types and vehicles’ re-
sources. Therefore, we introduce a reverse auction system in VCC, which is known as a tender-
ing system. Where a tenderee presents an assignment as long as two or more tenderers are willing
to participate. The tenderers will then submit their tenders cost to the tenderee. The tenderee will
select the tenderer who has a lower cost amongst them and stop the tendering system. Thus, both
the VCC server and follower vehicles can benefit from the task, and a win-win situation can be
achieved.
2.7 Related Work
Many works have been done to address the challenges arising out of security and privacy re-
quirements, and selfish vehicle issues in VCCs. In this section, we will briefly review some of
the most recent privacy-preserving incentive mechanisms introduced in the literature about VCC
and some existing cryptographic approaches that are related to our work.
2.7.1 Security and Privacy-preserving Incentive Mechanism in Vehicular
Cloud
Recently, a lot of attention has been directed towards VCC [22] [60]. In VCC, a vast number
of spare intelligent vehicles are viewed as service providers with plentiful onboard resources,
which are capable of providing various services. However, not all vehicle owners are willing to
provide their under-utilized onboard resources and participate in VCC. These type of vehicles are
referred to as selfish nodes. Selfish nodes have received vast attention with incentive mechanisms
as the most viable way of keeping them minimal by encouraging contribution.
Thus, L. Duan et al. [20] proposed a reward-based collaboration mechanism, where the client
first determines a total reward, and then announces it among collaborators. The client should
know the user’s collaboration costs in order to choose only users with the lowest costs by offering
a small total reward. If the client does not know users’ private cost information, then he needs to
offer a larger total reward to attract enough collaborators.
D. Yang et al. [91] [92] designed incentive mechanisms for vehicular sensing, where they
consider two system models; the platform-centric model that is responsible for providing a re-
ward shared by participating users, and the user-centric model who has more control over the
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payment. They used a Stackelberg game as an incentive mechanism, where the platform is the
leader and the users are the followers.
However, these works still did not consider the problem of how to preserve the privacy of the
involved vehicles. Consideration must be made to determine how to provide fair incentives to
encourage vehicles to participate in a VCC system without the risk of privacy disclosure.
Lee et al. [40] proposed a secure incentive framework, which encourages cooperation among
vehicular users in a secure way by leveraging a public key infrastructure to provide secure incen-
tives for cooperative nodes. The authors in [95] studied a game-theoretical resource allocation
strategy with a virtual machine migration in a cloud-based vehicular network. Lim et al. [46] pro-
posed a scheme to protect the privacy of vehicles while contributing their resources for services
in vehicular cloud-based on secure token reward systems.
Zhou et al. [103] proposed a threshold credit-based incentive mechanism to motivate coop-
eration among intermediate nodes, which maximizes the interest of vehicles, and guarantees the
fairness for participation in the vehicular cloud. In contrast, the authors in [47] proposed a secure
architecture for the vehicular cloud to encourage the potential vehicles to contribute their excess
resources to the cloud by issuing them secure tokens.
However, these incentive models require the real cost of vehicular resources to be known to
the cloud server, which is not practical. This is because the real cost information is considered
part of vehicle privacy. At the same time, these models cannot guarantee the participants’ truth-
fulness. For example, the malicious vehicles may deliberately claim a higher cost to maximize
their payoff. This is because malicious vehicles attempt to take actions solely to guarantee their
own payoffs. In addition, diversified vehicular resources make the incentive mechanism design
more complicated. Most previous works consider the evaluation of the resources in an ambigu-
ous way for simplicity [99], where they merely provide fixed monetary rewards for performing
different kinds of tasks. This is not adequate to guarantee the fairness among vehicles. The
utility brought by the sensing information is completely different with the storage or computing
resources, and therefore we cannot measure them in the same way. Even within the same type of
resource, the values can be different according to different characteristics. In addition, the secu-
rity and privacy schemes of these works do not consider the privacy issues during announcement
task.
Therefore, Yu et al. [94] proposed a reputation-aware task sub-delegation approach to identify
reliable workers to delegate tasks in a crowdsourcing system. In addition, Boutsis and Kalogeraki
[13] computed the reliability of workers and the probability that workers would execute tasks in
20
time based on the characteristics of tasks and the profiles of workers. Therefore, this scheme can
find a group of proper workers to perform tasks for customers.
An et al. [3] studied the credible crowdsourcing assignment model based on the social rela-
tionship cognition. They also proposed a service quality factor, link reliability factor, and region
heat factor to evaluate the crowdsourcing preferences of workers for improving the accuracy of
the task recommendations.
Xiao et al. [88] introduced an offline task assignment scheme and an online task recom-
mendation algorithm following the mobility pattern of workers. Guo et al. [31] discussed the
multi-task-oriented worker selection problem and proposed two task allocation frameworks to
improve the efficiency of large-scale spatial crowdsourcing platforms. One is a worker selec-
tion framework based on workers’ intentional movement for time-sensitive tasks, and the other
is a task recommendation framework according to an unintentional movement for delay-tolerant
tasks. Unfortunately, these schemes disclose the sensitive information to the cloud server to
support the task recommendation.
Therefore, to resolve the privacy leakage, To et al. [81] introduced a framework to protect
the locations of workers based on differential privacy and geocasting. This framework provides
heuristics and optimizations to determine effective geocast regions for reaching a high task as-
signment ratio with a low overhead.
Shen et al. [73] proposed a secure task assignment protocol by utilizing the additive ho-
momorphic encryption, which preserves worker’s location privacy in a semi-honest adversary
model. Consequently, Ni et al. [56] designed a privacy-preserving location matching scheme for
spatial tasks in a mobile crowdsensing from matrix multiplication, in which the sensing area of
the tasks and geographic location of workers are randomized by a random matrix to prevent the
cloud server learned workers’ locations. Besides, some privacy-preserving schemes [18] [19]
have been designed from anonymity techniques to achieve the unlinkability between the identi-
ties of the workers and sensitive information disclosed during spatial crowdsourcing services.
Different from the above schemes, our scheme is able to select the competence of the vehicles
without disclosing their private information, and it can ensure the confidentiality and integrity of
the message simultaneously. In addition, the incentive mechanism is able to guarantee the fair-
ness between vehicles in terms of payment. This is because the proposed incentive mechanism
is more targeted that lets the participants to be more trustful. Thus, it can be resulted in a high
welfare to both the cloud server and vehicles.
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2.7.2 Signcryption Schemes
For achieving confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity simultaneously, signcryption scheme
is used. The concept of the technique signcryption was first introduced by Zheng in [101].
The signcryption concept not only presents reduced computational costs but also has reduced
communication overheads in comparison to the approach that requires signing and encrypting
separately.
S.Moonseog et al. [71] proposed a domain-verifiable signcryption scheme, which is applied
to the Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) protocol. The scheme only predetermined n users within
the domain that can decrypt their own part of a message and verify the whole transaction. After
that, Malone-Lee [51] proposed the first identity-based signcryption scheme. Selvi et al. [67]
developed an identity-based threshold signcryption scheme and formally proved its security in
the existing security model.
Our privacy-preserving scheme mainly relies on the aggregation signcryption technique. The
aggregation concept is a digital signature scheme, which was first proposed by Boneh and others
[11]. The aggregate signature allows aggregation of different signatures by different users on
different messagesmi. The primary objective of an aggregate signature scheme is to achieve both
computation and communication efficiency. For example, when n users signed on n different
messages, it is possible to aggregate all these signatures into a single signature.
Gentry et al. [28] developed an efficient identity-based aggregate signature scheme. This
scheme can achieve full aggregation with a constant number of pairing operations during signa-
ture verification.
Selvi et al. [69] [70] analyzed the security in some aggregate signature schemes in [84] [85]
and introduced two identity-based aggregate signature schemes. However, the authors did not
present any proof for security. The scheme proposed in [69] cannot be considered an identity-
based system because the public key of the user is not an identity-based public key.
Consequently, Selvi et al. [68] introduced the first aggregate signcryption scheme, where the
researchers defined a comprehensive security model. The authors also, proposed some examples
to prove how secure their method is by using random oracle models. Based on Selvi scheme,
the author in [33] proposed an identity-based aggregate signcryption scheme as an appropriate
secure model as has been proven in its use in the random oracle [8].
However, it seems that these schemes still need significant improvements over pairing maps
used above. The Bilinear pairing operation is computationally intensive, leading these pairing-
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based schemes inefficient and impractical for VCC. Hence, in order to make the aggregate sign-
cryption scheme more efficient compared to the existing schemes [33] [68], we introduce an
efficient aggregate signcryption scheme, which is secure in the random oracle model [8].
2.7.3 Multiple Receiver Signcryption
In practice, broadcasting a message to multiple users in a secure and authenticated manner is an
important facility for any manager who wants to communicate with a group of people working
on the same project.
Thus, the first multiple receiver encryption concepts were introduced by Amos Fiat and Moni
Naor [25] as a form of broadcast encryption. They identified and analyzed central message
broadcasting problems to dynamically varying privileged user subsets in such a manner that
non-privileged class is unable to learn about the message. Following this, various experts have
proposed multiple broadcast encryption systems [32] [12].
Afterwards a number of papers also proposed multi-receiver signcryption system [71] [102],
which is also now known as broadcast signcryption. The basic idea of these schemes is that the
sender signcrypts n messages to n users. Each user can decrypt just his own message.
Li, Hu et al. [43] proposed a multi-receiver signcryption scheme based on bilinear pairing.
However, these schemes are based on traditional public key cryptography.
Duan et al. [21] introduced the multi-receiver identity-based signcryption. However, Tan [79]
showed that Duan et al.’s scheme is not secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks under
their defined security model.
Y.Yu et al. [97] proposed a new multi-receiver ID-based signcryption scheme. However, Selvi
et al. [38] showed that Y.Yu et al.’s scheme does not satisfy the unforgeability and presented an
improved scheme.
Accordingly, the multiple receiver identity-based signcryption scheme is emphasized in [83]
[61] [98]. Thy are considered as an appropriate secure model and have been proven in its use in
the random oracle model [8]. However, these schemes still suffer from increasing computational
cost due to the increasing number of receivers. For example, consider that a sender wants to send
a message to n receivers, which means he has to signcrypt the message n times for each receiver.
Therefore, the increasing number of receivers leads to increasing computation cost.
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2.7.4 Proxy Re-encryption
Proxy re-encryption is derived from the concept of decryption rights delegation, which was ini-
tially proposed by Mambo and Okamoto [52]. They gave some transformations that allow the
original recipient to forward specific ciphertexts to another recipient.
After that, Blaze et al. [9] furthered the concept of decryption rights delegation through
the idea of atomic proxy cryptography, in which a semi-trusted proxy computes a function that
converts ciphertext for Alice into ciphertext for Bob without revealing the underlying plaintext.
This scheme is only useful when the trust relationship between Alice and Bob is mutual.
S.Luo et al. [49], proposed two new unidirectional ID-based proxy re-encryption schemes,
which are both proved secure in the standard model. The first scheme is a single-hop IB-PRE that
allows the encryptor to decide whether the ciphertext can be re-encrypted. The second scheme is
a multi-hop IB-PRE, which allows the ciphertext re-encrypted multiple times without increasing
the size of ciphertext linearly.
Jun Shao [72] proposed the first anonymous ID-based proxy re-encryption (AIBPRE), which
can be proven-secure in the random oracle model based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
assumption and modified decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
B.Libert et al. [45] present the first construction of unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme
with chosen ciphertext security in the standard model. The scheme construction is based on a
reasonable complexity assumption in bilinear map groups.
In this thesis, we integrate the proxy re-encryption algorithm with the multiple receiver sign-
cryption scheme in order to design a new and efficient multiple receiver proxy re-signcryption
scheme. The scheme is able to eliminate the issue of increasing computational delay that results
from increasing the number of receivers.
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Chapter 3
A Privacy-preserving and Truthful
Tendering Framework for Vehicle Cloud
Computing
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, vehicles are becoming more powerful and intelligent due to various powerful built-in
sensors and on-board units [26]. Thus, S. Abdelhamid et al. [2] introduced a concept of Vehicle
as a Resource (VaaR), which focuses on making use of various vehicular resources such as VaaR-
Sensing and VaaR-Storage/Computing. Inspired by V aaS, S. Olariu et al. [59] proposed vehicle
cloud computing (VCC), which is an emerging vision of utilizing vehicular resources. The VCC
system typically consists of a cloud platform and a number of vehicles with various capabilities.
When there is a request for a task, a group of vehicles are recruited to accomplish it by bringing
their resources together.
Nevertheless, adequate vehicle participation is critical to the success of VCC applications.
A number of VCC applications have been proposed, which are based on the assumption that
vehicles voluntarily contribute to the VCC. However, vehicles incur some cost when they provide
their resources to the VCC. As a result, the vehicle owners may not be willing to participate
unless they receive incentives such as compensation for their resources [4]. Thus, a well-designed
incentive mechanism that stimulates vehicle participation is important. Some works use game
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theory such as Stackelberg Game to build incentive mechanisms [20] [91] [92] for vehicular
resource procurement. However, these works provide a fixed monetary [20] reward which is not
adequate to ensure vehicle participation. In addition, they assume the real cost of the vehicular
resources is known to the VCC server, which is also impractical because the cost information is
considered part of vehicle privacy. While that, the malicious vehicles may deliberately claim a
higher cost to maximize their payoff because strategic vehicle owners would take actions solely
to guarantee their own payoffs.
The fact that vehicles can provide diversified resources makes the incentive mechanism de-
sign more complicated. Most previous works that used game theory to stimulate vehicles owners
valuate the vehicular resources in an ambiguous way for simplicity [99]. On the downside, the
VCC may suffer with simplicity and ambiguity. For instance, the sensing information is totally
different compared with the storage and computing resources, and hence we cannot measure
them in the same way. Even within the same type of resource, the values can be different ac-
cording to different characteristics. Obviously, we need an expressive way to clearly describe
heterogeneous vehicular resources. We were inspired by a recent work [99], which creatively
describes the resources in the traditional cloud with a heterogeneous language. We establish an
expressive language that is capable of describing vehicular resources in the VCC system.
Motivated by several inherent advantages such as accurate pricing, many auction-based mech-
anisms have been proposed for cloud resource allocations. However, unlike these existing works,
we propose a tendering-based incentive mechanism and adapt it to our vehicular resource pro-
curement model. A tendering framework is a special type of auction in which the roles of buyer
and seller are reversed, often referred to as a reverse auction. Most importantly, the tendering
process is close to the way of how the VCC system works, where the cloud server prefers a lower
cost for a task and participating vehicles seek to maximum rewards for their resources. In ad-
dition, the heterogeneous resources are described by our expressive language that is suitable for
our tendering process. Nevertheless, to benefit from the tendering based heterogeneous resource
procurement mechanism, we still need to overcome several challenges.
First, it is challenging to design a tendering framework that is compatible with heteroge-
neous vehicular resources, which is different from the traditional goods considered in a classic
tendering process. Second, truthfulness is the major research effort for a tendering mechanism.
It eliminates the overhead of gaming over each other and enables the VCC server to assign the
tasks to the one with the highest value. A truthful mechanism helps us remove the burden of
accurate pricing for vehicular resources and adapts the price to dynamic changing status. Third,
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truthfulness and privacy are somewhat contradictory objectives. We need to protect the privacy
of truthful tenders during the process.
In this chapter, we aim at designing a truthful and privacy preserving tendering (TPPT) mech-
anism to solve the resource procurement problems in VCC. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work that builds a secure incentive mechanism based on a tendering framework. The
TPPT is resilient to strategic behaviors and preserves the tendering privacy at the same time.
What is more, the assignment rule can select an optimal subset of heterogeneous vehicular re-
sources with a minimum social cost. The main contributions are as follows:
• We design an illustrative language that is capable of describing heterogeneous vehicular
resource types. Based on this, a tendering-based incentive framework is proposed to stim-
ulate the participation of vehicles.
• We propose a truthful privacy preserving tendering (TPPT) mechanism that ensures truth-
ful tenders and helps a VCC server selecting vehicles with optimal parameters for the task.
• We conduct a numerical analysis of the TPPT mechanism to validate the effectiveness. The
results show that the proposed mechanism works effectively and guarantees the truthful
tenders compared to the other schemes in [20] [91] [92].
• We design a signcryption technique with a homomorphic concept in order to preserve the
truthful information reported by vehicles from being disclosed.
• We show the proposed privacy-preserving scheme is much more efficient in terms of com-
putational costs and ciphertext size compared to the other signcryption schemes in [68]
[33].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the system
model and the problems for TPPT designing. Next, we solve the problems and build TPPT in
Section 3.3. The security analysis of TPPT is presented in Section 3.4. Then, we give the results
of simulation in Section 3.5. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section 3.6.
3.2 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we first present the general tendering model for vehicle recruiting. Then, we de-
scribe our language for heterogeneous vehicular resources. After that, we summarize the design
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problems for an efficient TPPT framework.
3.2.1 System Model of Resource Procurement
We consider that a general Vehicle Cloud Computing system consists of a VCC server, a roadside
unit (RSU) and a number of vehicles denoted by N = {1, 2, ..., n}. The RSU acts as a gateway
between a VCC server and vehicles. When the VCC server searches vehicles for resources, it
sends a vehicle procurement message Φ to its connected RSU. The message includes the details
of the task requirements, and may differ according to different resource types. Then, the RSU
broadcasts this recruitment message to the vehicles under its range. The vehicles that are in-
terested in participating in the campaign will respond to the recruitment message. The trusted
authority (TA) is integrated into our system model, which is responsible for registering the ve-
hicles and creating accounts for each of the registered vehicles to record their payments. The
details of various tasks and required vehicular resources are described in Section 3.2.2. Next, we
explain some key components in our resource procurement model:
Task — To finish a task, the VCC server needs to search vehicles to jointly fulfill the task
with their vehicular resources. Φ specifies the resource requirements of the task.
Resource — Vehicular resources may differ between vehicles because of their different ca-
pabilities.
Cost — Vehicles incur extra operational costs for the resources. Let ci denote the total cost
of vehicle i for a given resource. Every vehicle expects a payoff larger than ci. We should notice
that ci is private information for each vehicle i, and the owner does not want to reveal this value
to others.
Tender — The vehicle that is participating in the procurement will submit a tender τi to the
VCC server. It includes the claimed cost of the resource c′i and the details of the resource it
provides. We consider c′i as the least payment that vehicle i claims to obtain by contributing
its resource. Any strategic participant tends to reply that a c′i is different from his true cost
to maximize his payoff. We use Γ = {τ1, τ2, ..., τn} to describe the tender vector of all the
participants.
Assignment Profile — After receiving the tender vector Γ, the VCC server needs to decide
the task assignment profile A = {a1, a2, ..., an}. For vehicle i, ai = 1 means assigned and ai = 0
means not assigned. The VCC server chooses the vehicle based on tenders and the requirements
of the task.
28
Payment profile — When distributing the tasks, the VCC server should also decide the pay-
ment for the vehicular resource. We have the payment profile P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} for all vehicles.
Utility — The utility ui(ai) refers to the ”net profit” tender i receives by finishing an assign-
ment ai. We can know that ui(ai) = pi − ci. As all vehicles are assumed to be rational, they will
try to maximize their utility during the tendering process.
Figure 3.1: System Model.
As it illustrated in Fig. 3.1, we use a tendering framework to model the interactive process
between the VCC server and vehicles by considering the VCC server as a tenderee and vehicles
as tenderers. The interactions between the VCC server and vehicles are described as follows:
1. The VCC server advertises a task Φ to one of its connected RSU in the VCC system.
2. The RSU broadcasts the resource procurement message Φ to all vehicles under its range.
3. The vehicles that are interested in participating will reply with their tenders Γ.
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4. Based on Γ, the VCC server jointly determine winning vehicles and their payments.
5. Wining vehicles perform the tasks and provide the corresponding resources to the VCC
server.
6. Each vehicle i is paid an amount of money pi for its wining tender τi.
The goal of tenderers is to maximize their utilities and tenderee aims to guarantee truthfulness
and maximize task assignment efficiency subject to the complicated resource forms.
3.2.2 Description of Heterogeneous Resources
The vehicular resources are with different characteristics because of uneven vehicular capabili-
ties. To make our system more practical, we categorize vehicular resources into two typical types
(VaaS-Sensing and Vaas-computing and storage) and map them into a concise and unified form
with an expressive language.
TYPE I: Sensing resource. Having a wide variety of sensors along with communication ca-
pabilities shapes the concept of Vehicle Cloud Sensing. This kind of application is very common
and generates our first vehicular resource type, which is the sensing information from vehicle
sensor devices [24] [86]. For a sensing task, the VCC server may need some information with
regard to a location and a specific time period. For instance, a weather forecasting task needs
various weather information such as temperature, wind and humidity for an appointed area and
time.
TYPE II: Storage/computing resource. With powerful advanced in-vehicle computing power,
it is foreseen that the VCC server will offload some computing tasks to vehicles [2]. In VCC,
vehicle-generated data or data obtained from neighboring vehicles can be stored until the vehicle
reaches a dedicated data collector or kept in the vehicle until retrieved as a reply to queries
sent by data-seeking vehicles. This is different from traditional mobile crowdsensing, where
each participating mobile device has limited computing power and more importantly is battery
powered. For this kind of task, vehicles are chosen to provide storage/computing resources in a
specific time period. Such requirement is widely seen in cloud market settings. For simplicity,
we assume the amount of resources offered by a vehicle can meet the required amount of the task
during its promised time period.
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Given the above two different kinds of resources, our target is to design an expressive lan-
guage that describes them in an uniform way. Both TYPE I and TYPE II tasks need resources
along with some time and location requirements. The task procurement message Φ = {RSC, ts, te, l}
specifies the time period [ts, te] and location l = (x, y) requirements for the resources RSC.
RSC includes at least one resource request (e.g., TYPE I or TYPE II) and might be diverse with
different task requirements. The vehicle can submit its tender if it is capable of supplying any
required resource in Φ. We use τi = {rsci, ti(s), ti(e), li, c′i} to represent the tender submitted
by vehicle i. rsci represents the resources that vehicle wants to provide. Different vehicles may
submit different resources rsci according to their various capabilities. rsci should include at
least one type of resource. [ti(s), ti(e)] ∈ [ts, te] and li = (xi, yi) denotes the time period and
location for the resources from vehicle i. c′i represents the declared cost of the resources and ve-
hicles may cheat on this information, which means they might refuse to report their true cost ci.
Each vehicle is aware of its own resources’ time period and location, through Global Positioning
System (GPS) or other localization systems [63]. A vehicle should not misreport the location and
time of the information in its tender. Misreporting may be detected easily and result in a serious
penalty. The location difference of each information can be calculated as di(l) = |li − l|.
The VCC server makes the decision of vehicle selection and payment determination based
on the tenders received. Most resources are time and location sensitive (e.g., the value of a
resource is influenced by its time and location). This is reasonable for both TYPE I and TYPE II
resources. Before announcing a task, the VCC server divides the time period into m time slots
t∗ = (t∗1, ..., t
∗




i = te − ts. Thus, the time slots
included by vehicle i are start from b ti(s)−ts
(te−ts)/mc+ 2 to b
ti(e)−ts
(te−ts)/mc. Different vehicles might have
their time slots overlapped.
Figure 3.2: Dividing the time period into m time slots.
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For each time slot, the VCC server targets to collect optimal resources from the closest lo-
cation. For different kind of resource, the VCC server only needs the optimal one for each time
slot t∗i , redundant resource will raise unnecessary costs. The VCC server hopes to choose a best
resource combination for each time slot. As illustrated in Fig. 3.3, the time interference and
various vehicular resources makes the resource recruiting problem highly complicate.
Figure 3.3: Illustration of conflict of all the available vehicular resources.
3.2.3 Problem Formulation
We first define some basic concepts for our tendering model. Then, we will discuss three chal-
lenges for TPPT design. Let si denote the tenderer i’s preference strategy and s−i be the strategy
profile of all the players except for i. ui(si, s−i) is the utility of i when its strategy is si and the
strategies of all other tenderers are s−i. We have the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Dominant Strategy). For any strategy s′i 6= si, given other players’ strategy pro-
files s−i. We call si dominant strategy if the utility ui of bidding si always satisfies the following
condition:
ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i).
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Definition 2 (Incentive Compatible (also called Truthfulness)). A mechanism is an incentive
compatible if reporting truth is the dominate strategy for all the tenderers.
With Incentive Compatible guarantee, there is no incentive for any player to lie about his pri-
vate information and no one can improve his utility by submitting a false tender. This guarantees
player i’s utility can be maximized by reporting its true cost, regardless of other players’ strategy
profiles s−i.
Definition 3 (Individual Rationality). A mechanism is individually rational if each player al-
ways gets a non-negative utility, which means that for any strategy si and any other players’
strategy profiles s−i, player i’s utility is ui(si, s−i) ≥ 0.
The individual rational mechanism ensures that the cost of the vehicles can be covered. This
serves as a basic condition for vehicle participation.
Definition 4 (Monotonic Assignment). An assignment rule A is a monotone if the assignment
ai(τi, τ−i) for vehicle i is monotonic decreasing with its claimed cost c′i.
Monotonicity in the tendering system means monotonic decreasing, which is the opposite
way from the auction model. Monotonic assignment rule for tendering ensures that a vehicular
resource with a lower cost can get more chances to be selected.
Definition 5 (Welfare Maximization). In the reverse auction, welfare maximization means the
assignment rule should minimize social cost
∑n
i=1 ciai, where ai is the amount of tasks assigned
to the truthful tenderer i. This means the VCC server prefers to assign the task to the one who
has a lower cost declaration. 1
Now, we propose the problems for the TPPT framework. For clarity, we assume there is a
single resource request during each tendering process2 in our discussion.
1In auction process, Welfare Maximization means auctioneer always allocates resources to the ones with higher
bids [42].
2For multi-information request case, we can extend our assignment and charging algorithm to such scenario
easily based on [104].
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Problem 1. (Winning Vehicles Determination Problem (WVDP)). Given a pool of candidate
vehicles N , the VCC server aims to gather the optimal vehicular resources that can cover as




ai · c′i ; argmax
n∑
i=1
ai · (ti(e)− ti(s)).
The VCC server hopes to choose a best resource for each time slot. It prefers to the vehicu-
lar resources with a lower cost ci and location difference di(l). As discussed in Section 3.2.2,
the optimal assignment rule design is complicated with heterogeneous vehicular resources. The
fundamental reason is that the resources among vehicles are subjected to time interference con-
straints. Thus, we can easily deduce that these constraints make the problem NP-complete [104].
Theorem 1 WVDP is NP-Complete.
Proof: We start our proof by introducing an instance of the Minimum Set Cover (MSC) problem
with an universe of k elements U = {ι1, ..., ιk} and a set of n sets H = {h1, ..., hn}. The object
of the MSC problem is to find the minimum-cardinality subset of H whose union contains all
the elements in U . We construct k time slots U ′ = {t∗1, ..., t∗k} based on U . Also, we construct h′i
from hi, where h′i is set of time slots belong to vehicle i. We aim to find the minimum-cardinality
subset of h′i ∈ H ′ whose union covers all the required time period U ′. Therefore, every instance
of the NP-complete MSC problem is polynomial-time reducible to the modified WVDP problem.
Problem 2. (Truthfulness Guarantee Problem (TGP)). The tendering mechanism should ensure
the incentive compatible and individual rationality. For each vehicle i, let τ ′i denote the untruthful
tender. The utility for truthful and untruthful tenderers are ui(τi, τ−i) and ui(τ ′i , τ−i). The TGP
is proposed to design a payment scheme that, for any vehicle i, we have:
ui(τi, τ−i) ≥ ui(τ ′i , τ−i)), and ui ≥ 0.
The vehicle’s real cost ci of performing the task is considered as a private information and
should be unknown to others. Each vehicle owner is selfish and always wants to maximize his
payoff. Thus, a vehicle i may manipulate c′i for its own good. This kind of strategic behavior
makes the VCC server difficult to decide the optimal vehicle set. Solving TGP can guarantee that
vehicles declare their costs truthfully. This enables the tenderee to make decisions easily based
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on trustful tenders.
Problem 3. (Privacy Preserving Problem (PPP)). When vehicles report their true values, they do
not want to share such sensitive information with the VCC server and other vehicles. Our system
should protect the privacy of the truthful tender.
By solving this problem, we can make sure truthful tenders will not be revealed to the others.
This will make our system trustful and give vehicles more confidence to act truthfully.
3.3 Design of TPPT
Aiming to design a privacy-preserving incentive scheme that solves the vehicular resource re-
cruiting problem. TPPT consists of a computational efficient task assignment rule that can solve
WVDP, a payment rule that helps to ensure truthfulness and a privacy-preserving scheme that can
protect the true tenders of the vehicles. In this part, we will discuss them in details and present
our TPPT.
3.3.1 Efficient Task Assignment Rule
We are trying to design a tendering mechanism with a two-step design paradigm. First of all,
assume truthfulness without a justification, we strive to design a task assignment rule that enables
a VCC server to select optimal parameters for a task. However, the NP-hardness of the problem
prevents us from using the traditionally VCC mechanism, which requires that the optimal set of
winners must be selected [24]. To achieve the desired property subject to computation efficiency,
we describe interferences of vehicular resources as a conflict graph and then adopt a greedy
algorithm to solve the problem.
If two resources overlap with more than one time slot, we consider them as conflict resources.
We model the time conflicts of the tenderers as a conflict graph G(V,E), as shown in Fig. 3.4.
The vertex represent the tenderers and two vertexes are connected if their time periods overlap.
The VCC server only needs the optimal one from the conflict resources set for each time slot.
The basic idea of greedy rule is to pick the next most cost-efficient tender that makes the ”greatest
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progress” towards finishing the task, and then deletes all its neighbors until no tenderers exist or
the required time period is covered.
Figure 3.4: Modeling the time conflicts of the tenderers as a conflict graph G(V,E).
Suppose c′i = ci, the assignment rule A aims to choose a set S of winners with a maximum
time coverage and a minimum social cost to finish the task. The process is as follows:
1. Sort the tenderers according to their cost values such that
c′1 < c
′
i < ... < c
′
n.
The resource with a lower cost tends to be more valuable. It is worth knowing that the
traditional mechanism only considers the resource cost when selecting winners. However,
this step is not sufficient to select an optimal vehicle especially when some of the tenderers







i+1 < ... < c
′
n.
In this case, we perform step 2.
2. Sort the tenderers that have same cost in the same time slot such that
dl(1)
α · c′1 < dl(2)α · c′2 < ... < dl(i)α · c′i.
Then, select the resource with a lower location difference. α is the influence factor of the
location difference. A small α makes the location difference more important.
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3. Pick smallest in step one and/or two as winner and then delete all its neighbors in the
sequence. Continue this step until
∑n
i=1 ai · t∗i ≥ te− ts or the tenderer sequence is empty.
Algorithm 1 describes our monotonic assignment procedure, where A denotes the tenders
that are still available and nbr(i) represents the neighbors of tenderer i.
Algorithm 1 Approximate Algorithm for TGP
Input: Task Φ and tender set Γ = {τ1, ..., τn}.
Output: Assignment set A = {a1, ..., an}.
1: A← Γ
2: for i = 1 : n do
3: ai = 0;
4: end for
5: Sort tenders according to c′i,
6: c′1 < c
′
2 < ... < c
′
n,
7: if c′1 = c′i then
8: Sort tenders sharing same cost according to their distance dl(i)α · c′i,
9: dl(1)
α · c′1 < dl(i)α · c′i < ... < dl(k)α · c′k,
10: end if
11: while A 6= ∅ do
12: i← argmin(c′i)





16: return A = {a1, a2, ..., an}
Lemma 1 Assuming truthfulness, the greedy assignment rule is a monotonic assignment.
Proof: Suppose tender τi wins in the q-th iteration. In the previous iteration, a number of winning
tenderers have been determined. We use a sorted list L storing these winning tenders in the order
that they have been determined. Suppose τi is in the q-th place. Assume ci replaced by c′i ≤ ci,
then tender τ ′i must have won in the q-th or an even earlier iteration. This proves the monotonicity
of the assignment rule.
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3.3.2 Computational Complexity
We now analyze the running time of our scheme for a given conflict graph G = (V,E) with n
tenderers and t∗ time slots. First, the VCC server needs to examine all n tenderers to find the
sets of k tenderers that share the same time slots. This process takes k|E| time for n tenderers.
The VCC server takes O(k log k) time to sort the tenderers sharing same time slots. Second, the
VCC server uses this sorted, and hence its complexity only comes from the process of finding
vehicles with the lowest-cost in each |E| for each time slot. Therefore, the overall complexity
of the VCC server is O(k|E|). Together, the overall complexity of the VCC server with strict
requests is O(k log k + |E|).
3.3.3 Critical Payment Scheme
Based on the greedy assignment rule, now we design a payment scheme to ensure truthfulness
and individual rationality, such that each vehicle honestly reports its true cost in a tender.
Definition 6 (Critical Neighbor [24] [42]). As shown in Fig. 3.5, for vehicle i, we call vehicle
i + 1 the critical neighbor nbr(i)∗ of vehicle i if i’s claimed cost is lower than nbr(i)∗, i will be
assigned; else, it will be not assigned.
Figure 3.5: Critical Neighbor
Definition 7 (Critical Value [24] [42]). We call c′i+1 critical value c∗i for vehicle i if i can only
win by declaring a cost that is lower than c∗i . In our Tendering model, it is represented by the
claimed cost of i’s critical neighbor.
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Lemma 2 If the assignment rule satisfies monotonicity [42], then for each tenderer, there exists
a critical value c∗i . If ci > c
∗
i it doesn’t receive the task, else it does.
Lemma 1 has shown the monotonicity of the assignment rule, we can know each tenderer
i has a corresponding critical value according to Lemma 2, and hence we have c∗i > ci. The
basic idea of finding critical tender is deleting τi and greedily selecting other tenders as shown
in Algorithm 1 until τi is useless. We use critical payment rule [24] [42] [57] for tendering to
determine the payment for the winning vehicles. Algorithm 2 describes our critical payment rule.
Definition 8 (Critical payment rule). The critical value based payment scheme P can be defined
as: pi = c∗i if i wins and pi = c
′
i otherwise.
Lemma 3 When the assignment rule satisfies monotonicity, the tendering mechanism is truthful
if the VCC server pays the winning tenderers their critical values.
Proof : When a mechanism has a monotone assignment rule accompanied with a critical payment
rule, it is easy to demonstrate the truthfulness, according to [24] [42] [57].
Theorem 2 TPPT satisfies truthfulness and individual rationality.
Proof : The truthfulness can be deduced based on Lemma 1-3. According to the payment rule, the
winning tenderer i is supposed to get paid with c∗i , which is largest than its cost. The other ten-
derers who are not selected will get zero utility since they do not need to provide their resources.
We can see all the tenderers will receive a non-negative utility by participating the tendering.
Thus, the individual rationality can be proofed.
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Algorithm 2 Critical Payment Determination Algorithm
Input: Assignment profile A tenderers N and conflict graph G.
Output: Payment profile P
1: for i = 1 : N do
2: if ai = 0 then
3: pi = 0
4: else
5: A← N \ {i}
6: while A 6= ∅ do
7: k ← argmin(c′i)
8: if k ∈ nbr(i) then











15: return P = {p1, p2, ..., pn}
3.3.4 Privacy-Preserving Scheme
In this work, we integrate the signcryption technique [101] with a homomorphic concept [27]
in order to protect truthful tenders’ information from being disclosed. Before introducing our
cryptosystem scheme, we recall bilinear group, which is the bases of our privacy scheme.
Definition 9 (Bilinear Group). Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic additive groups of the same prime
order q. A mapping ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is called an admissible bilinear pairing if (ê) has the
following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all P,Q, V ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have
– ê(P,Q+ V ) = ê(P,Q)ê(P, V ).
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– ê(P +Q, V ) = ê(P, V )ê(Q, V ).
– ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab = ê(bP, aQ).
• Non-Degeneracy: P,Q ∈ G1, where
– P 6= 0⇒ ê(P,Q) ∈ G2.
– P 6= 0⇒ ê(P,Q) 6= 1.
• Computability: P,Q ∈ G1, there must exist an efficient polynomial time algorithm to
compute ê(P,Q).
The admissible bilinear pairing ê can be implemented by either Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic
curves [10].
Complexity Assumptions
We assume the discrete logarithm problem related to our security proposal as follows.
Definition 10 Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem. Given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, ∀a, b ∈
Z∗q , the (CDH) problem is to compute abP ∈ G1 probability within polynomial time.
Definition 11 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem. Given P, aP, bP, cP ∈
G1, ∀a, b, c ∈ Z∗q and f ∈ G2, DBDH problem is to decide whether f = ê(P, P )abc.
3.3.5 Proposed TPPT Mechanism
In TPPT, tenderers submit their encrypted tenders to the connected RSU. Then, the RSU pre-
processes them and sends the results to the VCC server (tenderee). The tenderee decrypts the
processed ciphertexts and obtain only the necessary information to run the tendering process.
The proposed scheme is based on a key-homomorphic concept and a signcryption technique. We
present the design details of the TPPT as follows.
Phase 1: Initialization. The TA generates the bilinear parameters (G1, G2, P , ê, q) by given the
security parameter κ. Then, it selects a large random prime number s ∈ Z∗q as a master private
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key and computes the corresponding public key Ppub = sP , where P is a generator of G1. Ad-
ditionally, the TA determines three secure cryptographic hash functions: H1 : Z∗q → {0, 1}256,
H2 : G1 → {0, 1}256, H3 : {0, 1}256 → G1. Therefore, the system public parameters published
as param = (G1,G2, q, P, ê, Ppub, H1, H2, H3).
Phase 2: Key-Generation. Any vehicle i that wants to join the system, it should send its identity
IDi to the TA. In order to protect the vehicle’s identity, the TA will generate a pseudo identity
Qi = H3(IDi) for the vehicle i. Then, for each vehicle i, the TA selects a random number
xi → Z∗q as vehicle i’s private key and computes pki = xiP as vehicle i’s public key. The public
and private keys (pki, xi) are sent to the vehicle i with its pseudo identity Qi.
Phase 3: Tendering. Each vehicle i signcrypts its tender τi = {rsci, ti(s), ti(e), li, c′i} values as
the following. The vehicle i randomly selects ri ∈ Z∗q and computes,
• Di = riP .
• Ci = ric′i(pkvc + Ppub).
• c′′i = Ci/Di.
• Li = rili(pkvc + Ppub).
• l′i = Li/Di.
• Ti = t∗iP , where t∗i = ti(s), ti(e).
• Fi = ripkvc.





• Si = ri(pkrsu + Zi).
• Ri = H1(c′′i , l′i, rsci).
• Ki = Ri ⊕H2(Fi).
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• hi = H3(Ki).
• σi = (xi + ri)hi.
• αi = (Ki, σi, Di, Si).
Thus, the vehicle i’s cipheretext is αi that will be sent to the RSU.
Phase 4: Aggregate-Verification. We adopt the aggregation technique in our proposed scheme
to enable the RSU to aggregate all ciphertexts (αi)ni=1 into one ciphertext (αagg) and verify them
simultaneously. Whenever receiving (αi)ni=1, the RSU computes the following.
1. Aggregation. The RSU aggregates multiple of (αi)ni=1 into a single (αagg) by performing
the following steps.
• Takes a collection of individual ciphertexts αi = (Ki, σi, Di, Si)ni=1, which are gen-




• Computes the signature aggregation σagg =
∑n
i=1 σi.
• Outputs the aggregate ciphertexts αagg = (K1...Kn, D1...Dn, S1...Sn, σagg).
2. Batch Verification. By given (σagg), pseudo identities (Qi)ni=1 and corresponding public
keys (pki)ni=1, the RSU computes hi = (H3(Ki))
n
i=1 and accepts the aggregation signature







If the batch verification holds, the RSU will accept αagg as a valid ciphertexts αi =
(Ki, σi, Di, Si)
n
i=1. Then, the RSU will continue to complete the Phase 5.
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• The correctness of our signature scheme is as follows.
ê(P, σagg) = ê(
n∑
i=1













Phase 5: Preprocessing. It is worth to point out that the ciphertext helps to detect the vehicles
that share the same time slot. In this step, the RSU objects to sort the vehicles that share the same
time slot as follows.
• For each vehicle i, the RSU computes,
Wi = ê(Ppub, Si)ê(Ppub, xrsuDi)
−1
= ê(Ppub, Ui)
Note that, the tenders that have same W values are share same time slot.
• Sorts the vehicles that share the same time slot as,
ei = {W1, ...,Wm}
Although these steps run by the RSU, the RSU knows nothing about the tenders’ values
because all the processes are running on the ciphertexts. The data collection and pre-processes
are shown in Fig. 3.6. Where E = {e1, ..., en} denotes the collection of edges. The RSU then
sends each ei with their corresponding (α̂i)mi=1 information to the VCC server. Where α̂i =
(Ri, σi, Di).
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Figure 3.6: Homomorphic Preprocessing
• The correctness of W value is illustrated as follows.
Wi = ê(Ppub, Si)ê(Ppub, xrsuDi)
−1
= ê(Ppub, ri(pkrsu + Zi))ê(Ppub, xrsuriP )
−1
= ê(Ppub, ripkrsu)ê(Ppub, riZi)ê(Ppub, xrsuriP )
−1






Phase 6: Tendering processing by a VCC server. After receiving the processed data E =
{e1, ..., en} from the RSU, the VCC server determines the winners and their payments as the
following steps:
• Conflict graph construction: After receiving E with their corresponding (α̂i)ni=1 informa-
tion, the VCC server builds the conflict graph based on each vehicular resource’s time
period information as shown in Fig. 3.7.
• Monotonic task assignment: The VCC server uses his private key (xvc) to start decrypt the
ciphertexts (α̂i)ni=1 as follows.
– F ′i = xvcDi.
– R′i = Ki ⊕H2(F ′i ).
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W1 W2 W3 W4 W5
W6 W7 W8 W9 Wn
ei
Figure 3.7: Sorting the tenderers that share the same time slot.
Then, it sorts them an ascending order according to their cost value c′′i . Where c
′′
i is the
encrypted value for c′i. Thus, the VCC server will know nothing about the vehicle i’s real
cost c′i value, even that after decrypting the ciphertext α̂i, and hence the vehicle i’s privacy




i · |(l′i)− (l)|α.
After that, the VCC server manipulates Algorithm 1 to determine the assignment vector A.
• Critical charging: The VCC server determines the critical neighbor nbr(i)∗ of the win-
ner by running Algorithm 2. Then, the VCC server requests for the critical value from
the RSU. The RSU replies with an encrypted message of the winner Qi’s critical value,
E(cnbr(i)∗). Finally, the VCC server decrypts the encrypted critical value for each winner
and announces the assignment vector along with their payments.
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• The correctness of our unsigncryption scheme is as follows.
R′i = Ki ⊕H2(F ′i )
= Ri ⊕H2(Fi)⊕H2(F ′i )
= Ri ⊕H2(ripkvc)⊕H2(xvcDi)
= Ri ⊕H2(ripkvc)⊕H2(xvcriP )
= Ri ⊕H2(ripkvc)⊕H2(ripkvc)
= Ri
• Then, the VCC server extracts (c′′i , l′i, rsci) values from Ri. Where c′′i and l′i → Z∗q , which



































In this section, we briefly summarize the security properties of TPPT.
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• Security and Privacy Preservation. In TPPT, we integrate a signcryption technique with a
homomorphic concept to protect tenderers’ privacy from being disclosed. Before submit-
ting the tenders, the tenderer i signcrypts its tender value and sends it as a ciphertext (αi)
to the RSU. The RSU acts as a trustful intermediary agent. It pre-processes the encrypted
tenders, and then sends the processed resultsEi = {e1, ..., ei} to the VCC server. The VCC
server decrypts the ciphertexts and then starts running the tendering system by performing
Algorithm 1 without knowing the cost c′i during the tendering process. This is because the





• Confidentiality and Integrity. The proposed scheme guarantees the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the message source. In line with Definition 1, the message is signed and en-
crypted under the CDH problem in order to achieve the confidentiality and integrity of
the message. Thus, the adversary cannot decrypt any message without knowing the re-
ceiver’s private key and ri, which is randomly chosen from the sender and used to calculate
Di = riP and Fi = ri(pkvc). In addition, the adversary cannot sign any message without
having the sender’s private key that is used to calculate σi = (xi + ri)hi. As a result, only
the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext by computing F ′i = xvcDi, where F
′
i contains the
receiver’s private key. Therefore, according to Definition 1, the proposed scheme achieves
confidentiality and integrity under the CDH problem.
• Mutual Authentication. The authentication phase is achieved by our proposed scheme,
thanks to the signcryption technique. Under the scheme, the VCC server is authenticated
by the signature on the message that is generated by the vehicle. In order to establish
the mutual authentication, the sender calculates Di, Fi = ripkvc and σi = (xi + ri)hi,
through the signcryption algorithm in the process of signcrypting the message (i.e. mi).
The receiver (VCC server) computes F ′i in order to establish the mutual authentication
and authenticates the source report message by verifying the signature σi on receiving the
ciphertext. Thus, the adversary cannot forge the signature on the message without knowing
the sender’s private key under the DBDH problem.
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3.5 Performance Evaluation
3.5.1 Performance of Privacy-Preserving
In this section, we analyse the performance of the proposed privacy-preserving scheme and com-
pare it with the existing schemes in [33] [68]. We evaluate our proposed scheme in terms of the
computational cost and communication overhead.
1. Computational Cost. In this case, a comparison is made between the scheme’s efficiency
and that of the aggregated signcryption schemes present in [33] [68]. Similar to the op-
erations multiplication of a scalar in G1, G2 exponentiation and computation cost pairing,
which are considered as the most important computation operations in time consumption
computation. The comparison of computational costs among the schemes is shown in ta-
ble 3.1. Where Tpair denotes the time consumption of pairing, Tpmul denotes the time
consumption of a scalar point multiplication in G1 and Texp denotes the time consumption
of an exponentiation in G2. The proposed scheme algorithm takes 8 multiplication oper-
ations in G1 in order to compute the signcryption phase. In contrast, the unsigncryption
phase takes one multiplication operation in G1 and three pairing operations in G2. There-
fore, as shown in table 3.1, the computation cost in the proposed scheme is more efficient
than existing schemes.
Table 3.1: Computation cost and communication overhead analysis
Scheme Computation Cost Communication Overhead
Y.Han et.al 5Tpair + 4Tpmult 2|G1|+ n|m|+ n|ID|
(IBAS 1) 5Tpair + 3Tpmult (n+ 1)|G1|+ n|m|+ n|ID|
(IBAS 3) 5Tpair + 6Tpmult (n+ 2)|G1|+ n|m|+ n|ID|
Proposed 3Tpair + 9Tpmult n(|m|+ 2|G1|)
The proposed privacy-preserving scheme efficiency of computation is done by using an
MNT curve with Tate pairing, that is, ê: G1×G1 → G2. This is defined over the employed
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curve, where the curves embedment degree is 6 and q is given as 160 bits. Intel Pentium
IV 3.0 GHZ machine is used in the execution of the procedure [66]. The running time is
displayed in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Cryptographic operation running time
Descriptions Execution Time
Tpmul Multiplication in G1 0.6 ms
Tpair Pairing operation 4.5 ms
Fig. 3.8 shows the comparison of the computational cost between the existing schemes
and our proposed scheme. The running time is given as 18.9 ms. As a result, the proposed
scheme shows high efficiency and justification in relation to time.
2. Communication Overhead. The communication overhead is determined by the size of the
ciphertext length. Here, we analyse the communication overhead of TPPT in two aspects,
vehicle-to-RSU communication and RSU-to-VCC server communication. We first con-
sider the vehicle-to-RSU communication, when a vehicle sends its tender value, it needs
to send the encrypted tender value αi to the RSU, which is (|m| + 3|G1|). If we assume
the binary length for each multiplication of the scalar point in G1 is 160 bits, we have
256 + 480 bits for each αi. Then, we consider the RSU-to-VCC server communication.
After receiving the tender values, the RSU needs to find the sharing time slot ei and for-
wards the (α̂i)mi=1 to the VCC server, which is n(|m| + 2|G1|). The binary length of the
encrypted (α̂i)mi=1 is m(256 + 320) bits that can be increased with the growth of m. Table
3.1 shows that the proposed scheme reduces the communication overhead. By summariz-
ing the above evaluations, we have an efficient protocol that has a lower computation time
than other schemes, with a lower communication cost. Thus, our scheme is suitable for


























Figure 3.8: Efficiency comparison with other schemes.
3.5.2 Effectiveness Analysis of TPPT
In this section, we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of TPPT. We first
demonstrate the truthfulness and individual rationality, and then we explore the property of TPPT
in terms of social cost and satisfaction. As common practice, social cost is the total payments,
and user satisfaction can be defined as the number of winning tenderers. While the VCC server
satisfaction can be defined when the number of winning tenderers can cover all the required time
periods. Thus, the users and VCC server satisfaction are considered as an important performance
metric to measure the auction-based applications. We assume each tenderer’s true cost is uni-
formly distributed over [5,15]. By default, the VCC server only has one kind of resource request
for each task. We calculate the results average over 500 rounds.
In our simulation, we assume a single tenderee that handles tenderers in a geographic area.
All tenderers are randomly deployed in a 50 × 50 square. Fig. 3.9 illustrates the utilities for
each user under three different behaviors. In the experiment, we choose 100 vehicles, each of
them holds vehicular resource with a random location and time slots. We set the time period
requirement [ts, te] as 15 time slots. The untruthful claimed cost is measured by the ratio of the
claimed cost to the true cost [86]. We can infer that vehicles always get more utilities from their
truthful tenders. This guarantees that every rational tenderer will report their true value. It also
shows that any vehicle will obtain nonnegative utility when submitting a true cost. Moreover, we
51
can find that most untruthful higher tenderers get a zero utility. This is because most of them are
excluded from the candidate’s set with a high claim cost. Additionally, untruthful lower tenderers
get a negative utility in some cases; this is because they win with a lower claimed cost but get
a payment pi that cannot be even balance off the cost of resource. By summarizing the above
cases, the results show that our TPPT scheme works effectively and guarantees the truthfulness
of users, compared to other game theory schemes such as Stackelberg in [20] [91] [92].
Figure 3.9: Verification of truthfulness and individual rationality
To explore the performance of our truthful incentive mechanism, we evaluate the user sat-
isfaction and VCC server satisfaction of TPPT in Fig. 3.10 and Fig. 3.11 under three different
time periods. We can infer that, the users and VCC server satisfaction are influenced by various
number of the participating vehicles and time periods.
As shown in Fig. 3.10,the users satisfaction are influenced by various number of the time
periods. We express the time period with different amount of time slots (i.e. 40,80,120). We can
know that the number of winning vehicles is monotonic increasing with the change of participants
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and required time length. Thus, the user satisfactory increases when the required time period
slots is increased. This is because the user has more chance to be selected as a winner. However,
the difference is not obvious when the number of participants is small. This is because of a less
diversity of vehicular resources caused by smaller participants and limited vehicular resource
demands induced by a short time length.
In contrast, the VCC server becomes more satisfactory, as shown in Fig. 3.11, when the
number of participants is large with small required time period. This is because the VCC server
can find trustful users with a maximum time coverage and a minimum social cost to finish the
task.
Fig. 3.12, depicts the performance of the social cost with a number of vehicles being varied
from 10 to 200. At the beginning, the social cost increases because the number of recruited
vehicles keep increasing. However, the social cost becomes steady or even shows a minor decline
when the vehicles exceeds 120. This is because when there are more vehicles, the VCC server
can find cheaper resources to perform the task. The general social cost increases with the time
period. The difference is not obvious when the number of vehicles is less than 100. Because
given the small quantity of participants, the time period of the vehicular resources are within a
smaller range. Thus, the difference of winning vehicles is small.
Although the VCC server can find cheaper resources to perform the task when there are
more vehicles, the issue is determined when some of the tenderers have the same social cost.
Thus, we sort the tenderers that have the same cost according to their location distances such
that dl(i − 1)α · c′i−1 < dl(i)α · c′i < ... < dl(k)α · c′k. Fig. 3.13 shows the impact of α in
vehicle’s location. We set three fix values of α parameter to be (0.2, 0.5 and 0.9), and we fix
the all vehicles’ cost to be $10. A vehicle with a near distance and a low cost tends to be more
valuable. α is the impact factor of the location difference. The small α value makes the location
more important.
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Required time period = 40 time slots
Required time period = 80 time slots
Required time period = 120 time slots
Figure 3.10: User Satisfaction





















Required time period = 40 time slots
Required time period = 80 time slots
Required time period = 120 time slots
Figure 3.11: VCC Satisfaction

















Required time period = 40 time slots
Required time period = 80 time slots
Required time period = 120 time slots
Figure 3.12: Social Cost



























In this chapter, we solve the heterogeneous vehicular resource recruitments in the VCC system
through the introduction of an innovative truthful tendering framework. It can minimize the
social cost while satisfying a maximized time coverage. Unlike existing works, we describe
various vehicular resources with our expressive language. Then, we present a greedy algorithm
for heterogeneous vehicle selecting along with a payment rule that can ensure the truthfulness.
At the same time we combine a homomorphic concept with a signcryption technique to protect
vehicle’s privacy. We confirm the truthfulness and evaluate the properties of the tendering mech-
anism with different simulations. In addition, we show the proposed privacy-preserving scheme




Secure and Privacy-preserving Task
Announcement In Vehicular Cloud
4.1 Introduction
Vehicular Cloud Computing (VCC) is a new paradigm that has a prominent impact on a traffic
management and road safety [60]. In VCCs, a number of vehicles with abundant resources are
viewed as service providers. These vehicles together can accomplish the tasks announcement by
the VCC server. A typical VCC job processing procedure consists of a task announcement phase
which is from the cloud server to the vehicles and a service providing phase when the vehicles
send their sensing data to the cloud server. Accordingly, numerous VCC based applications have
been proposed to make use of vehicles as resource providers in VCCs [60].
Although vehicles are considered as perfect candidates to provide various services, there still
exist significant challenges in the real application of VCCs. The security issue is essential to the
VCC system success. Specifically, the vehicles’ privacy should be protected when they providing
their services. Otherwise, it could be dangerous to vehicle owners. Consequently, the owners
may choose to quit if they feel that their privacy cannot be guaranteed. Obviously, we need a
well-designed privacy-preserving scheme to protect the vehicles’ privacy in a VCC system. In
light of this reality, some schemes have been proposed [47]. However, they only concentrate on
privacy issues of the service providing phase by protecting the information from the vehicles to
the VCC server. The task announcement phase seems to be neglected. Most existing frameworks
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assume the tasks can be simply sent out to the vehicle by the VCC server. Unfortunately, this
may cause serious issues to the vehicles’ privacy. As we know, a task issued by the VCC server
often includes the details of what should be done by the vehicles. A vehicle that accepts the task
has a high possibility to satisfy these requirements.
Without appropriate protection, these task requirements may also be manipulated by the ad-
versary and cause privacy disclosure. Consider the following scenario, a cloud server hopes to
broadcast several tasks with a specific location, time, etc. If all the tasks are sent without pro-
tection, any malicious individual can trace the tasks to a participating vehicle. Consequently, it
can reveal the vehicle’s trajectory by correlating multiple tasks accepted by the same vehicle. As
a result, the vehicle’s privacy could be compromised even though the vehicle is anonymous, for
example, using pseudonym. This is because vehicle is driven by a person who usually has fixed
daily routine. For example, going to work place at 9:00 am and coming back home at 6:00 pm.
As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, the vehicle’s daily routine is disclosed easily with the information of
multiple tasks fulfilled by it. Obviously, the vehicle’s privacy can be easily revealed knowing
more tasks participated by it.
In order to fully protect the participants’ privacy in VCC system, we need to ensure secu-
rity and privacy of the information exchanged between the VCC server and vehicles at both task
announcement phase and service providing phase. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid
to privacy issues with task announcement in the VCC system. Nonetheless, for successful pro-
tection of announced task in VCC, we still need to overcome multiple challenges facing this
emerging sector. Firstly, the challenge is not all about the authenticity of the source of an an-
nounced task but also extends to integrity as well as confidentiality of the announced task. Thus,
it is important to design a security and privacy-preserving task announcement to guarantee that
the announced task is not accessed or forged at the time of transmission by adversary. Secondly,
such a system should allow for mutual authentication between the cloud server and vehicles.
The system should be able to verify and decrypt the data simultaneously on low computational
and communication costs. Finally, the system should be lightweight as a result of constraints in
energy use and storage.
To successfully address the aforementioned issues, the multiple receiver signcryption tech-
nique [25] is used in pursuing the security objectives. This technique enables the broadcaster to
sign and encrypt the message simultaneously for a specific number of receivers. It provides the
most efficient solution to this dual problem of confidentiality, integrity and authentication. How-
ever, the multiple receiver signcryption technique is suffering from the issue of increasing the
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computational cost and time consumption that results from an increasing number of receivers. It
is computationally intensive and leads to inefficient and impractical for VCC.
Motivated by the above mentioned issues, we aim to design an efficient privacy-preserving
scheme for VCC based announced task management by integrating a multiple receiver sign-
cryption technique with a proxy re-encryption technique. Our work is different from existing
works [74] [62], as it provides vehicle’s privacy, authenticity, confidentiality and integrity as
well as data forward security for tasks announcement with saving computational cost and com-
munication overhead. Concretely, vehicles and the VCC server communicate to each other via
Roadside unit (RSU). With our proposed scheme, sensitive task messages can be securely and
efficiently transmitted from the VCC server to vehicle(s). To be more specific, the main contri-
butions of this scheme include:
• We first propose a new efficient multiple receiver proxy re-signcryption scheme (MRPRS)
by combining signcryption and proxy re-encryption techniques. Our scheme eliminates
the issue of increased computation delay that most multiple receiver signcryption schemes
are suffering from, especially when the number of receivers become larger.
• Then, we use the proposed MRPRS as concealing technique to prevent the vehicles’ pri-
vacy from being disclosed during the task announcement.
• The proposed scheme shows the efficiency in terms of computational costs and ciphertext
size compared to existing multiple receiver signcryption schemes [83] [61] [98] and proxy
re-encryption schemes in [49] [72] [45].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the system
model, security requirements, and design goals followed by its preliminaries in Section 4.3.
In Section 4.4, the proposed MRPRS is presented in detail. In Section 4.5, we describe the
secure and privacy-preserving task announcement in vehicular cloud. In Section 4.6, the security
analysis is shown and performance evaluation is shown in Section 4.7, respectively. Finally, we
draw our conclusion in Section 4.8.
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Figure 4.1: A simple trajectory and location-based inference attack on announced task in VCC.
4.2 System Model, Security Requirements and Design Goals
In this section, we introduce the system model, show the security requirements, and identify the
design goals.
4.2.1 System Model
In our system model, we consider a general vehicular cloud service request framework. As
shown in Fig. 4.2, the system consists of a VCC server, a roadside unit (RSU), a number of
vehicles. When the VCC server needs to recruit vehicles for their resources, it will announce a
task towards one of its connected RSUs. The task announcement always includes specific details
of the task’s requirements, and may differ according to different location and time. The RSU
acts as a gateway between the VCC server and vehicles, it helps to direct the messages from the
VCC server to vehicles and all messages from the vehicles to the VCC server. The vehicle that
is interested in joining the announced task, it will respond with its parameter. The VCC server
then chooses vehicles with optimal parameters to act as resource providers. A trusted authority
(TA) is integrated into the VCC system, which is responsible for registration vehicles.
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4.2.2 Security Requirements
In our security model, we focus our attention to the threat of the task announcement generated
by the VCC server, which is then forwarded to the vehicles via RSU. Announced tasks devoid
of content oriented privacy may result in disclosing the vehicle’s privacy. For example, the
adversaries or the malicious RSU can disclose the private information of the vehicles by eaves-
dropping on an announced task that includes specific requirements. Frequently accepting special
tasks enable the adversary to trace vehicle and reveal its sensitive information such as location
and lifestyle. Additionally, the malicious RSU can encroach on a vehicle’s privacy by creating a
fake task that includes specific requirements to disclose the privacy of any vehicle that responded
on this forged task. Therefore, to prevent the adversary and malicious RSU from violating the
vehicle’s privacy during task announcement, the following security requirements should be sat-
isfied.
• Data confidentiality should be provided. Ensuring that the announced task do not reveal
sensitive information. Even if the adversary or RSU eavesdrops on the announced task, it
cannot reveal the content of the message and cannot determine the message destination.
• Authentication and integrity should be provided. Data manipulation by unauthorized par-
ties should be detected. Only the VCC server is in charge of issuing announced task
messages to vehicles and only the authorized announced tasks from the VCC server can be
accepted by vehicles.
• Vehicle’s privacy should be protected. Protection of vehicle’s identity and location is of a
paramount importance in the VCC system.
4.2.3 Design Goals
Our design goal is to propose a lightweight privacy-preserving scheme for a task management
system to achieve the above security requirements. Specifically, the goals that are to be achieved
are as follows.
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Figure 4.2: A Task Announcement Model in Vehicular Cloud.
• Privacy-preservation: The proposed scheme should provide data integrity and authentica-
tion as well as data confidentiality. This involves the ability to authenticate the source of
the message and to ensure the integrity of the message with guarantee that the forwarded
message does not reveal sensitive information of the message. In addition, the proposed
scheme should protect the personal information of the participant during the authentication
and forwarding process.
• Efficiency: The proposed scheme should also be efficient in terms of computation cost and
the communication overhead compared to existing schemes.
4.3 Preliminaries
4.3.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups with same prime order q. A mapping ê :
G1 ×G1 → G2 is called an admissible bilinear pairing if (ê) has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all Q, V ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q , we have,
ê(V a, Qb) = ê(V,Q)ab = ê(V b, Qa).
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• Symmetric: ê(V,Q) = ê(Q, V ).
• Non-Degeneracy: ê(V,Q) 6= 1G2 , where V,Q 6= 1G2 .
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(V,Q).
The admissible bilinear pairing ê can be implemented by either Weil/Tate pairings over elliptic
curves [10].
4.3.2 Complexity Assumptions
We assume the discrete logarithm problem that related to our security proposal as follows.
• Definition 1: Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem. Given g, ga, gb ∈ G1, ∀a, b ∈
Z∗q , the CDH problem is to compute g
ab ∈ G1.
• Definition 2: Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem. Given g, ga, gb, gc ∈
G1, ∀a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , the DBDH problem is to decide whether f = ê(g, g)abc, where f ∈ G2.
4.4 Proposed MRPRS Scheme
In this section, we propose an efficient MRPRS scheme, which serves as basis of our secure
and privacy-preserving task announcement. The proposed scheme is based on multiple receiver
signcryption schemes in [83] [61] [98]. However, their schemes are suffering from increased
computational cost, as the number of receivers increase. We address this problem by integrat-
ing the proxy re-encryption with multiple receiver signcryption. Our scheme lets the sender to
signcrypt the message just one time, which is signcrypting the message to himself and delegates
number n of receivers to open it instead of signcrypting the message n time to n receivers. The
proposed MRPRS scheme is composed by the following algorithms.
• System setup(λ). This algorithm runs by the TA. Given the security parameter λ, the TA
chooses G1 and G2 as finite multiplicative cyclic groups with the same prime order q, g is
a generator of G1, and a bilinear map ê : G1 ×G1 → G2. The TA determines three secure
cryptographic hash functions: H1 : G1 → Z∗q , H2 : G1 → {0, 1}∗ and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G1.
The system public parameters published as param = (G1, G2, q, g, ê, H1, H2, H3).
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• Key-Generation(param, IDi). This algorithm runs by the TA. For each user i, the TA
selects a random number xi ∈ Z∗q as user i’s private key, and computes the corresponding
public key Xi = gxi . Then, (Xi, xi) will be sent to the user i in a secure manner.
• Signcryption(Xs, xs,m). This algorithm runs by the sender IDs to signcrypt the message
mi ∈M . The sender IDs randomly selects ri, vi ∈ Z∗q and computes,
– Ei = (Xs)ri .
– Vi = gviri .
– Fi = H2(Vi)⊕mi.
– Zi = H3(Fi).
– σi = (Zi · Ei)xs .
• Re-key(xs, (Xi)ni=1). This algorithm runs by the sender IDs to compute the Re-key and
delegates to a number of receivers as follows,
– Ti = gri .
– hi = H1(Ti).
– Rks→R = hi∗vixs .
– Uj = (Xj)ri , for (j = 1, ..., n).
– Return the ciphertext αi = (Ei, Fi, σi, U1, ....., Un), and Re-key (Rks→R).
• Re-signcryption(Rk, xpx, σ). This algorithm runs by the proxy IDpx to re-signcrypt the
message as follows.




xs = grihivi .
– σ′i = (E ′i)xpx · σi.
– Return α′i = (E ′i, Fi, σ′i, U1, ....., Un).
• Verification(σ′i). This algorithm runs by the receive IDi. The receiver IDi verifies if the





i)ê(Xs, (Zi · Ei)).
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• Unsigncryption(xi, σ′i). This algorithm runs by the receive IDi. If the output of the verifi-
cation is true, the receiver IDi will decrypt the message as follows,




– h′i = H1(T ′i ).




– m′ = Fi ⊕H2(V ′i ).
• The correctness of our signature scheme is as follows:




= ê(g, (E ′i)
xpx)ê(g, σi)
= ê(g, (E ′i)
xpx)ê(g, (Zi · Ei)xs)
= ê(gxpx , E ′i)ê(g
xs , (Zi · Ei))
= ê(Xpx, E
′
i)ê(Xs, (Zi · Ei))
• The correctness of T ′i = Ti is as follows:










= (gri) = Ti
• The correctness of V ′i = Vi is as follows:


















= (grivii ) = Vi
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• The correctness of unsigncryption is as follows:
m′i = Fi ⊕H2(V ′i )
= H2(Vi)⊕mi ⊕H2(V ′i )
= mi
4.5 Secure and Privacy-preserving Task Announcement
In this section, we present the details of our secure and privacy-preserving task announcement.
In VCC system, the VCC server sends a requirement task announcement to vehicles via RSU
in order to recruit vehicles for their resources. These type of messages can be exploited by an
adversary or even malicious RSU to disclose private data of the vehicles. Therefore, in order to
protect the participants’ privacy in VCC system during announced tasks, we designed a secure
and privacy-preserving task announcement based on our proposed MRPRS scheme. In this ap-
plication scenario, the VCC server signcrypts the message and delegates number of vehicles to
decrypt it. The RSU is considered as a semi-proxy who is responsible to re-signcrypt the mes-
sage and then forward it to the all vehicles under its communication range. The vehicles verify
the signature on the receiving message and only the delegated vehicles are able to unsigncrypt
the ciphertext. The proposed MRPRS scheme is introduced in the task announcement to fulfill
the design objectives. The protocol consists as the following.
• System Initialization. Given the security parameter λ, the TA is responsible to publish
param = (G1, G2, q, g, ê, H1, H2, H3) as we described in System setup in Section 4.4.
• Registration and Key Generation. For each vehicle i, the TA selects a random number
xi ∈ Z∗q and computes Xi = gxi as vehicle i’s private/public keys. Then, the TA returns Xi
and xi to the vehicle i.
Remark. In order to protect the vehicle i’s identity privacy, the TA generates a pseudo
identity Qi = H3(IDi) and publishes it with the vehicle i’s public/private keys. Notably,
as the VCC server and RSU are public institutions, it is not necessary to protect their
identities privacy.
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• Data formulation and sending. When the VCC server searches vehicles for collabora-
tion, it will deliver the content of the announced task with its specifications towards the
RSU. The VCC server authenticates itself to the vehicles and protects the content of the
announced task from any malicious RSU or adversaries by signcrypting the task message
mi through performing the Signcryption phase in Section 4.4.
Signcryption(Xs, xs,mi).
Assume the VCC server has a complete knowledge about the vehicles within the coverage
area in each RSU. Thus, the VCC server will generate a Re-key and delegates a number of
registered vehicles to decrypt the ciphertext message as described in Section 4.4.
Re− key(xs, (Xi)ni=1).
Then, the VCC server sends the ciphertext αi = (Ei, Fi, σi, U1, ..., Un) with Rks→v to its
connected RSU.
• Data transmission. After receiving the ciphertext αi from the VCC server, the RSU will
use its private key xr with the re-encryption key (Rks→v) to re-signcrypt the ciphertext αi
as follows.
Re− signcryption(Rks→v, xr, σ).




i, U1, ..., Un) to all vehicles within its com-
munication range.






i)ê(Xs, (Zi · Ei)).
• Data receiving. If the verification is valid; then, each vehicle i uses its private key xi with




Fig. 4.3, illustrates the secure and privacy-preserving task announcement in the VCC
system.
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Figure 4.3: Secure and Privacy-preserving Task Announcement.
4.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze how the proposed MRPRS scheme achieves the design goals in Sec-
tion 4.2.
• The proposed scheme can provide confidentiality and integrity for the task announcement
in the VCC system. The message is signed and encrypted under definition 1 (CHD) prob-
lem, which is secure in the random oracle model [8]. Thus, the adversary cannot decrypt
any message without knowing the receiver private key and r, v which are randomly chosen
from the VCC server and used to compute V = grv, T = gr. Also, the adversary can-
not sign and re-sign any message without having the VCC server and RSU private keys.
Since the proposed scheme employs a random integer in encryption and signature, it can
resist the possible replay attack. Thus, using our proposed scheme we fulfills the goal of
protecting task announcement against tracing and forgery attack.
• The proposed scheme can provide authentication. Under (DBDH) problem, the vehicle i
authenticates the source of the task message by verifying the signature σ′i on the receiving
ciphertext.
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• The proposed scheme can provide vehicle’s data privacy preservation. The RSU and other
participating vehicles know nothing about the content of the message and destination,
which guarantees privacy preservation. Although the RSU re-signcrypts the task message,
it is still unable to learn anything about the destination and contact of the message.
4.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme in terms of the computa-
tional cost and communication overhead. As the operations of bilinear pairing and exponentia-
tion in G1 and exponentiation in G2 dominate the computational overhead of the algorithms, we
mainly consider the time consumption of these operations. Due to the fact that our proposed MR-
PRS scheme combines the multiple receiver signcryption algorithm with proxy re-encryption, we
compare it with the existing proxy re-encryption schemes in [49] [72] [45] and with other multi-
ple receivers signcryption schemes in [83] [61] [98].
Table 4.1: Cryptographic operation comparison with other schemes.
Scheme Encrypt RK −Gen Re− Encrypt Decrypt
[45] 3t1 + tp + t2 t1 4t1 + 2tp tp + t2
[72] 3t1 + tp + t2 2t1 + tp + t2 6tp t1 + 2tp
[49] 4t1 + tp + t2 3t1 2tp + t2 2tp
Proposed 3t1 2t1 2t1 2t1 + 3tp
1. Computational Cost.
a) In this case, a comparison is made between our scheme and the other proxy re-encryption
schemes present in [49] [72] [45]. Table 4.1 shows the computational costs comparison
among the schemes. Where tp, t1, t2 denote as the time consumption of pairing, exponen-
tiation in G1 and exponentiation in G2, respectively. On basis of the result of the running
time as shown in Fig. 4.4, the proposed scheme have 9 exponentiation in G1 and 3 pairing
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operations when the sender A signcrypts the message and receiver B decrypts it. The run-
ning time is given as, 9 ∗ 1.0 + 3 ∗ 2.9 = 17.7 ms. Therefore, the time computation cost in



























Figure 4.4: Efficiency comparison with other schemes.
b) In this case, a comparison is made between our scheme and other multiple receiver
signcryption schemes in [83] [61] [98]. We mainly compare the computational cost at
the signcryption operation phase. The proposed scheme, only takes 3t1 for signcrypting a
message to one or even to number n receivers. This is because the sender signcrypts the
message one time which is to himself, and then delegates a number of receivers to decrypt
it by computing Uj = (Xvij )
n
j=1. As a result, the value of Ui will not affect the computation
cost when the sender signcrypts the message. Fig. 4.5 shows the average computational
delay between the proposed scheme and other existing schemes. The result shows that the
scheme cannot be affected by increasing the number of the receivers compared to other
schemes. Therefore, the computation cost is almost negligible in the proposed scheme
and eliminates the issue of increased computation delay that most of multiple receiver
signcryption schemes are suffering from, when the number of receivers are increased.
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Table 4.2: Computational and communication overhead analysis.
Scheme Communication Overhead Time Signcryption
X.Wang [83] n(2 + |G1|+ |G2|+ n|ID′|) + |m| n
B.Zhang [98] (2 + 2n)|G1|+ |m|+ n|ID′| n
L.Pang [61] (2 + 2n)|G1|+ |m|+ n|ID| n
proposed scheme (3 + n)|G1|+ |m| 1
To quantify the running time of the operations as displayed in table 4.3, we calculate
the computation time for signcryption and unsigncryption by using an MNT curve. The
curve’s embedment degree is 6 and 160-bit q on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ machine
[66].
Table 4.3: Cryptographic operation running time.
Descriptions Execution Time
tp Pairing operation 2.9 ms
t1 Exponentiation in G1 1.0 ms
t2 Exponentiation in G2 0.2 ms
2. Communication Overhead.
The communication overhead determines the size of the ciphertext length. Since cipher-
text size is an important factor affecting the efficiency, we present the comparison with
respect to it. To make the comparison convincing, we compare the efficiency of our
proposed scheme with existing proxy re-encryption schemes and multiple receiver sign-
cryption schemes. In the proposed scheme the original ciphertext for one receiver is de-
scribed as αi = (Ei, Fi, σi, Ui). While the original ciphertext for n receivers is described
as αi = (Ei, Fi, σi, U1, ..., Un). Table 4.4 shows the communication overhead in our pro-
posed scheme in terms of one receiver compared to proxy re-encryption schemes exists
in [49] [72] [45]. While in table 4.2, we compare the communication overhead in our pro-
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Table 4.4: Computational and communication overhead analysis
Scheme Computational Cost Communication Overhead
B.Libert [45] 8t1 + 4tp + 2t2 |pks|+ 2|G1|+ |G2|+ |σs|
J.Shao [72] 6t1 + 10tp + 2t2 3|G1|+ |G2|
S.Luo [49] 7t1 + 5tp + 2t2 3|G1|+ |G2|
Proposed scheme 9t1 + 3tp 3|G1|+ |m|
posed scheme with the multiple receivers signcryption schemes in [83] [61] [98] in terms
of n of receivers. Thus, we can see that we have an efficient scheme that has much lower
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Figure 4.5: Efficiency comparison with other schemes
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel privacy-preserving mechanism to secure the task an-
nouncement in VCC system. In this mechanism, the VCC server signcrypts the task in order
to conceal the task’s content from any adversary or malicious RSU. The RSU re-signcrypts the
message without knowing the content of this task or even destination. The proposed scheme
combines the proxy re-encryption algorithm with the multiple receiver signcryption scheme in
order to eliminate the increasing of computation cost when the number of receivers increase.
Through performance analysis, we demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in
terms of the computational overhead and ciphertext size. The security analysis shows that the







Spatial Crowdsourcing [17] is a compelling paradigm that engages individuals in collecting,
processing and analyzing data about environmental phenomena, social events, and other spatio-
temporal information. With spatial crowdsourcing, customers outsource their spatial tasks to
a group of workers, i.e., mobile users that collect data from specific regions using their de-
vices [100]. Typically, a spatial crowdsourcing server (SC-server) acts as a broker between cus-
tomers and workers to recruit workers for task fulfillment, and the workers participate in spatial
crowdsourcing activities voluntarily or motivated by benefits. As this human-centric problem-
solving paradigm is highly flexible, it can significantly reduce the cost and shorten the time on
task accomplishment. Furthermore, with human intelligence, spatial crowdsourcing can improve
the quality of task completion, such as translation and labelling. Currently, spatial crowdsourc-
ing supports numerous applications in domains (e.g., journalism, environmental sensing, crisis
response and urban planning).
Unlike traditional company, in which the tasks are accomplished by fix employees, spatial
crowdsourcing recruits a set of workers from Internet to perform. Thus, this paradigm is feasible
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only if workers and tasks are matched effectively on both time and locations [82]. For example,
to measure the traffic congestion in downtown Toronto at the morning peak hours, the SC-server
should assign tasks to the workers driving on the roads in downtown Toronto at those hours.
Otherwise, the workers have to pay extra costs on travelling and time to reach the required loca-
tions for task performing, which may discourage workers to participate in spatial crowdsourcing
activities. Therefore, it is necessary for the SC-server to take into account the workers’ locations
when allocating spatial tasks. However, the SC-server may not be fully trusted, and the disclo-
sure of individual locations has serious privacy implications from the perspective of workers. It is
possible for attackers to predict the trajectory and living habit of a specific worker [64]. Protect-
ing location privacy is essential in spatial crowdsourcing, as the workers may refuse to engage in
spatial tasks if their privacy is invaded. To preserve worker’s location privacy on task recommen-
dation, many solutions have been proposed based on mix network, anonymity techniques and
location differential privacy in spatial crowdsourcing. Unfortunately, these techniques have their
inherit drawbacks. Specifically, mix network is built on the assumption that at least one of the
network nodes is not compromised; the anonymity techniques, such as pseudonyms, blind signa-
tures and group signatures, require either pseudonyms management or complex zero-knowledge
proof to protect the workers’ identities; and the location differential privacy sacrifices the accu-
racy of location matching to ensure the location privacy. Therefore, exploiting new approaches
to preserve the location privacy for workers still deserves to may more efforts.
Even if the location privacy leakage is prevented, the crowdsourcing reports may still expose
location information about customers [55]. For instances, from photos, videos and other spatial
data, the attackers can know the places these photos and videos are taken and spatial data are
collected, and thereby learn the locations of data sources. As a result, the location privacy of
workers is violated. Moreover, the exposure of crowdsourcing reports might leak other personal
information about workers, such as identities, occupations, references, home addresses, social
relations, health status, and political ideology, which may cause plenty of troubles in daily life,
e.g., malicious advertisements and harassing phone calls, even result in economic loss. In ad-
dition, the spatial tasks would expose the points of interest of customers, and their intension to
release these tasks. In short, preserving crowdsourcing reports and spatial tasks are quite vital
for workers in spatial crowdsourcing.
In this chapter, we propose a location privacy-aware task recommendation framework, called
LATE, to protect the workers’ locations during task recommendation in spatial crowdsourcing.
By leveraging Lagrange Interpolating Polynomials, we achieve the privacy-preserving matching
between the locations of workers and the geocast areas of spatial tasks in LATE. Specifically, the
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main contributions are as follows:
• A privacy-preserving location matching mechanism is designed from Lagrange Interpo-
lating Polynomials. The geocast region of the spatial task is encrypted using a temperate
public key and a searchable tag is generated from the worker’s location and the corre-
sponding temperate secret key. Having the ciphertext and tag, anyone can test whether the
worker’s location is one of the places in the geocast region.
• By leveraging the designed privacy-preserving location mechanism, LATE achieves se-
cure spatial task recommendation with location privacy preservation for workers. The
SC-server cannot know the geocast regions of spatial tasks and geographic locations of
workers, but is enabled to determine whether the workers are located in the geocast regions
of spatial tasks. Thereby, the SC-server can recommend the spatial tasks to the workers for
fulfillment. In addition, we utilize a proxy re-encryption to encrypt the spatial tasks and
crowdsourcing reports to prevent privacy leakage for both customers and workers.
• We prove the security of LATE to show that no attacker can learn anything about the
locations of workers and the geocast areas of spatial tasks, and demonstrate the LATE is
efficient and practical in terms of computational and communication overhead.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. We first define the system model, threat
model and design goals in Section 5.2. Then, we describe the LATE framework in Section 5.3
and discuss its security in Section 5.4, followed by the performance evaluation in Section 5.5.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 5.6.
5.2 Problem Statement
In this section, we define system models and security threats, and identify the design goals.
5.2.1 System Model
The spatial crowdsourcing system provides a people-centric approach to customers for data col-
lection and analysis. As shown in Fig. 5.1, the architecture consists of four entities: a SC-server,
a trust management server, customers and workers.
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SC-Server: The SC-server offers spatial crowdsourcing services to customers. It has suffi-
cient storage space, computational capability and communication bandwidth. It is responsible to
receive spatial tasks from customers, recommend tasks to workers and collect the crowdsourcing
reports to fulfill the tasks for customers.
Trust Management Server: The trust management server aims to manage the trust levels
of all workers. It keeps the trust levels or reputations of workers and enables the SC-server to
check whether the participating worker is honest to perform the recommended spatial tasks.
Customers: The customers can be individuals, corporations or organizations. They have
some spatial tasks to accomplish, but they are unwilling to perform by themselves, and thereby
they outsource their tasks on the SC-server and recruit workers to fulfill for them.
Workers: Each worker has the devices to perform the spatial tasks, e.g., smart phones,
tablets, vehicles, computers and other items with sensors, computational units and storage spaces.
These devices are carried by their owners wherever they go and whatever they do. The work-
ers also make sure the sufficient power on devices to support their functions. With the devices,
the workers can participate in spatial tasks by collecting data from environment, analyze data,
process images and upload the reports to the SC server.
5.2.2 Security Threats
The spatial crowdsourcing system is confronted with serious security threats from both exter-
nal and internal attackers. Specifically, the external attackers, e.g., eavesdroppers and hackers,
wiretap on wireless communication channels to capture the messages exchanged between work-
ers and SC-servers, and attack the servers or devices to obtain the administration rights. The
internal adversaries include the SC-server and workers. The SC-server is honest to offer spatial
crowdsourcing service to customers, but it may be curious on the workers. It may strive to know
the spatia-temporal probability distribution for a specific worker and other sensitive information
about workers and customers, e.g., preference, social relation, political affiliation and purchase
intention, from the maintained information, including spatial tasks and crowdsourcing reports.
The workers also try to learn sensitive information about the customers and the other workers.
Specifically, they are willing to know the other workers participating in the same tasks, and learn
more knowledge about customers to reach their expectancy. The geographic locations are ex-
tracted from Google Maps or GPS trusted chip on devices, modifying the locations for workers
is infeasible. The trust management server is protected by trusted components and it is fully
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Figure 5.1: System Model.
trusted by customers, workers and the SC-server. The customers are honest as well, since, being
the beneficiaries, they have no incentives to disrupt the spatial crowdsourcing service.
5.2.3 Design Goals
To enable location privacy-aware task recommendation under the aforementioned system model
and resist security threats, the LATE should achieve the following design goals:
• Task Recommendation: The spatial tasks should be recommended to the workers located
in the geocast regions of spatial tasks to reduce the travel cost and time on task fulfillment,
and the other workers outside the geocast regions should not learn any knowledge about
the spatial tasks, even it they can obtain the encrypted spatial tasks.
• Location Privacy Preservation: The geographic locations of workers and the geocast re-
gions of tasks are protected against malicious attackers and curious entities. The SC-server
or a worker is only aware whether the geographical position is in the geocast area or not.
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• Data Confidentiality: The crowdsourcing reports can only be accessed by the delegated
customers, such that the privacy of workers would not be exposed to others.
5.3 The LATE Protocol
In this section, we propose the LATE protocol consisting of four phases, Service Setup, Task
Releasing, Task Recommendation and Task Fulfillment. We first review the preliminaries, which
is the basis of the LATE protocol.
5.3.1 Preliminaries















1 , x = xi.
0 , x ∈ {x1, · · · , xn} \ {xi}.
Bilinear Pairing: Suppose G be a cyclic additive group with a prime order q, and GT be a cyclic
multiplicative group of the same order q. P is a generator of G. The map ê : G1 × G1 → G2 is
an admissible bilinear pairing [10] if the following conditions hold:
1. Bilinearity: for all a, b ∈ Z∗q , ê(P, P )ab = ê(aP, bP ).
2. Non-degeneracy: ê(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
3. Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê.
Complexity assumption: The intractable mathematical problem and complexity assumption
used are as follows.
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Co-Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (Co-DBDH) problem [15]: Given< P, aP, bP,Q, Z >
for some a, b ∈ Z∗q , P,Q ∈ G and Z ∈ GT , output “1” if Z = ê(P,Q)ab and “0”, otherwise.
Definition 1. An algorithm B with an output β ∈ {0, 1} has an advantage ε in solving the
Co-DBDH problem that | Pr[B(P, aP, bP,Q, ê(P,Q)ab) = 1]−Pr[B(P, aP, bP,Q, Z) = 1] |≥ ε
where a, b are randomly from Z∗q and Z is a random element from GT .
The (τ, ε)-Co-DBDH assumption holds if no polynomial-time algorithm has an advantage ε
within running time τ in solving the Co-DBDH problem.
5.3.2 The Detailed LATE
To achieve privacy-aware task recommendation, we uniquely utilize the Lagrange Interpolating
Polynomials to design the location matching in LATE. We allow the SC-server to check whether
the locations of workers are in the geocast areas of spatial tasks, without exposing the users’
locations and geocast areas. In fact, the public key encryption with keyword search scheme [96]
can be utilized to achieve the privacy-preserving matching for workers. Specifically, the geocast
areas of spatial tasks are represented as a vector L = {l1, l2, · · · , ln}, and the location of a worker
U is supported to be l. The SC-server can learn whether l ∈ L with no knowledge about l and L.
Thus, the SC-server can recommend the task with L to U , if l ∈ L. The detailed construction of
LATE is described below.
Service Setup
The SC-server bootstraps the whole service and setups the system parameters. It chooses a
security parameter k, which ensures the security level of the system and determines the prime
order q of the bilinear groups. In general, k = 256 or 160. Let G be an additive cyclic group
with a generator P and GT be a multiplicative cyclic group equipped with q. ê is a bilinear
map ê : G × G → GT . The service provider picks a random Q ∈ G1 and two collision
resistant hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1. C = EAES(K,M) and
M = DAES(K,C) are the encryption and decryption algorithm of AES. The public parameter
is gp = {q,G1, G2, ê, P,Q,H1, H2}. Besides, the SC-server initializes the service geographic
regions for customers by defining the points of interest in the regions, such as shopping malls,
plazas, museums and buildings.
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A worker U is required to generate a public-private key pair (pk, sk) by picking a random
s ∈ Z∗q to compute Ppub = sP . The public key is Ppub, while the private key is s. The certificate
authority (CA) in public key infrastructure (PKI) issues and signs the certificate certu for U ,
which includes series number, Ppub, signature algorithm, and signature, etc. The certificate is
allowed the public to check the validity of U’s public key, and U’s secret key is kept on a Memory
Protection Unit (MPU) to restrict access.
A customer C randomly chooses v ∈ Z∗q as the secret key and computes the public key as
Vpub = vP . The CA also generates and issues a certificate certc for C. C keeps its secret key a
MPU to restrict publicly access.
The trust management server (TMS) initializes its service for trust management for workers.
It maintains a list LM to record the trust level for each worker. TMS randomly picks t ∈ Z∗q as
the secret key and calculates the public key as Tpub = tP . The CA also generates and issues a
certificate certt for TMS. TMS keeps its secret key on a MPU.
Task Releasing
When the customer C is willing to fulfill spatial crowdsourcing, it generates a spatial task
ST = (Cont, Expt, L), which indicates the content (what to sense), the expiration time (when
to sense), the geocast area (where to sense). Other attributes (e.g., reporting interval, benefits,
reporting periods) can be illustrated in Cont. C picks a random number num as the identifier.
The geocast area L is denoted as L = {l1, l2, · · · , ln}, in which li ∈ L a set of points of in-
terest from which C needs to collect and analyze data. To prevent the exposure of geocast area
L = {l1, l2, · · · , ln}, C generates a series of encrypted points of interest in the following way:
1. Pick a random value k ∈ Z∗q as the temperate secret key and compute the corresponding
temperate public key Kpub = kP .
2. Pick a random value γ ∈ Z∗q to compute,
• C1 = γP , and
• h = H1(num, certc, ê(Kpub, γQ)).
80






= ai,1 + ai,2x+ · · ·+ ai,nxn−1.
where ai,1, · · · , ai,n ∈ Z∗p .
4. For i = {1, · · · , n}, randomly pick αi ∈ Z∗q , and calculate,




5. For i = {1, · · · , n}, compute,




6. Set the ciphertexts of geocast area of L = {l1, l2, · · · , ln} as,
C = (R1, · · · , Rn, U1, · · · , Un, C1, h).
Further, to prevent the task exposure, C utilizes TMS’s public key to encrypt Cont, that is,
picks a random value w ∈ Z∗q , Z ∈ GT and computes,
• D0 = EAES(H1(num,Z), Cont),
• D1 = wtP ,
• D2 = Z ⊕ ê(P, P )w.
After that, C also utilizes the TMS’s public key Tpub to encrypt the temperate secret key k by
randomly choosing r ∈ Z∗q , Y ∈ GT to compute,
• E0 = EAES(H1(num, Y ), k),
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• E1 = trP ,
• E2 = Y ⊕ ê(P, P )r.
Finally, C sends the encrypted spatial task T = (num,Expt, C,D0, D1, D2, E0, E1, E2) to
the SC-server, and the SC-server releases T on its website.
Task Recommendation
When the worker U wants to participate in spatial crowdsourcing activities, U performs the
following interactions with TMS and SC-server to retrieve the recommended spatial task:
1. U forwards certu to the TMS.
2. The TMS checks U’s trust level inLM . If U is trusted, the TMS computesE = ê(E1, Ppub)t
−1
and returns (certt, E) to U.
3. U utilizes its secret key s to decrypt (E,E0, E2) as,
• Y = E2 ⊕ Es
−1 ,
• k = DAES(H1(num, Y ), E0)
4. U uses the location l to compute a location trapdoor Tl = (T1, T2) as
• T1 = H1(l),
• T2 = k(Q+H2(l || num)).
Then, U sends (certu, Tl) to the SC-server.
5. The SC-server uses Tl to compute
λ = R1 +R2T1 + · · ·+RnT n−11 (mod q),
ν = U1 + U2T1 + · · ·+ UnT n−11 (mod q)
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If the equation (1) holds, which means that U’s location l is in the geocast area L, the SC-
server returns (num, certu, D0, D1, D2, Expt) to the TMS; otherwise, it returns failure to
U and aborts.
6. The TMS re-encrypts the ciphertext ofCont to be decryptable for U as,D = ê(D1, Ppub)t
−1
and sends (num, certu, D0, D,D2, Expt) to U.
7. U utilizes its secret key s to decrypt (D,D0, D2) as,
• Z = D2 ⊕Ds
−1 ,
• Cont = DAES(H1(num,Z), D0).
Finally, U obtains the content of task ST and performs the task if ST is not expired.
Task Fulfillment
U performs the spatial task ST and generates a crowdsourcing report Rc. To protect Rc, U uses
C’s public key Vpub to encryptRc using AES to generate a ciphertextFc and sends (num, certu, Fc)
to C. Finally, C decrypts Fc to recover U’s report Rc and fulfills the spatial task ST according to
the crowdsourcing reports from workers.
5.3.3 Correctness of LATE
Suppose l ∈ L = {l1, l2 · · · , ln}) without loss of generality, the correctness of task recommen-
dation can be justified as follows:
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λ = R1 + · · ·+RiT i−11 + · · ·+RnT n−11
= a1,1y1X1 + · · ·+ an,1ynXn + · · ·
+ a1,iy1X1T
i−1
1 + · · ·+ an,iynXnT i−11 + · · ·
+ a1,ny1X1T
n−1
1 + · · ·+ an,nynXnT n−11
= (a1,1 + · · ·+ a1,nT n−11 )y1X1 + · · ·
+ (ai,1 + · · ·+ ai,nT n−11 )yiXi + · · ·
+ (an,1 + · · ·+ an,nT n−11 )ynXn
= yiXi
ν = U1 + · · ·+ UnT n−11
= (a1,1 + · · ·+ a1,nT n−11 )α1Kpub + · · ·
+ (ai,1 + · · ·+ ai,nT n−11 )αiKpub + · · ·
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Figure 5.2: Location privacy-aware task recommendation.
5.4 Security Discussion
In this section, we discuss the confidentiality of the workers’ locations and crowdsourcing reports
in LATE.
The goal of location privacy is to protect the workers’ locations from being known by others.
To protect the workers’ locations, it is necessary to preserve the geocast areas of spatial tasks,
since anyone can detect whether a worker’s location is in the public geocast areas. Therefore,
the confidentiality of geocast areas is critical for the protection of workers’ locations. Thereby,
the location privacy can be divided into two parts: geocast area privacy and worker’s location
privacy. The geocast area L is encrypted by a temperate public key Kpub to generate C =
(R1, · · · , Rn, U1, · · · , Un, C1, h). If there exists an adversary A who can identify the points of
interest in L, there exists another algorithm C who can use A to solve an instance of the Co-
DBDH problem, that is, given (P, u1 = aP, u2 = bP,Q, Z ∈ G2), its goal is to tell whether
Z = ê(P,Q)ab. We employee a simulator C to interact with A to prove the indistinguishability
of the points of interest in L. To prove that, C setups the system by defining the public parameters
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(q,G,GT , ê, P,Q,Kpub, H1, H2), in which Ppub = u2 and H1, H2 are random oracles, and sends
the public parameters to A. C can answer the H1-queries, H2-queries and trapdoor queries from
A. A produces two points of interest l∗0 and l∗1, and generates the ciphertext on one of them c∗β , in
which β ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, if A outputs a correct guess β′ ∈ {0, 1} that β′ = β, C can utilize the
guess to solve an instance of the co-DBDH problem. Since the co-DBDH problem is intractable,
it is impossible for A to distinguish the encrypted points of interest. Therefore, the LATE can
achieve the confidentiality of geocast areas of spatial tasks. In terms of the secrecy of a worker’s
location l, it is hashed to generate the location trapdoor Tl. As the hash function is one-way, it
is impossible for the adversary A to learn any knowledge about the worker’s location, unless it
tests all the locations to find the proper one.
The spatial tasks and crowdsourcing reports are encrypted using the proxy re-encryption
scheme [6] to prevent malicious attackers, e.g., eavesdroppers, hackers, to learn the private in-
formation about the customers and workers. Specifically, the customer encrypts the spatial task
using the public key Tpub of TMS and the TMS is able to transform the ciphertext of spatial
task to be decryptable for the recommended workers. Similarly, the worker utilizes the public
key of the customer Vpub to protect the crowdsourcing reports Rc. The confidentiality of spatial
tasks directly depends on the sematic security of the proxy re-encryption scheme, which can be
reduced to the simplified q−DBDHI assumption [6] and the secrecy of crowdsourcing reports
can be reduced to the security of AES.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
To demonstrate the computational overhead of LATE, we count the number of complicate crypto-
graphic operations, including scalar multiplication inG, multiplication inGT , the exponentiation
in GT and the bilinear pairing. We denote by SMG, MulGT , ExpGT and BP , the point multi-
plication in G1, multiplication in G2, the exponentiation in G2 and the pairing computation. We
also execute our proposed LATE on a notebook with Intel Core i5-4200U CPU @2.29GHz and
4.00GB memory. We use MIRACL library 5.6.1 to implement number-theoretic based methods
of cryptography. The Weil pairing is utilized to realize the bilinear pairing operation. To ensure
the security of the LATE, the parameter q is approximately 160 bits and the elliptic curve is
defined as y = x3 + 1 over Fp, where p is 512 bits. The number of complicate cryptographic
operations and the run time of each phase in LATE are in Table 5.1.
86
Table 5.1: Computational overhead of LATE.
Phases Operations Run Time (ms)
Setup 3SMG 17.4
Releasing (2n+ 4)SMG + 3ExpGT + 3BP 185.4
Recommendation (2n− 1)SMG +MulGT 206.9
+4ExpGT + 4P
Fulfillment 0 10.5
We also analyze the communication overhead of LATE. When a customer outsources a spatial
task, it needs to send the encrypted spatial task T to the SC-server, which is 4864+1024n bits,
if we assume the binary length of Expt, Cont and num is 256 bits. A worker also sends its
(certc, Tl) to the SC-server and receives the recommended spatial task. In Fig. 5.3, we show the
binary length of the encrypted spatial task with respect to the number of location in the geocast
region of a spatial area. The binary length of the encrypted spatial task increases linearly with
the growth of n.

























Figure 5.3: Communication Overhead.
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5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a location privacy-aware task recommendation framework to protect
the location privacy for workers during task recommendation in spatial crowdsourcing. Specif-
ically, we have designed a privacy-preserving location matching mechanism to enable the SC-
server to determine whether the workers are located in the geographic areas of spatial tasks with-
out learning any information about workers’ locations. Thus, the SC-server is able to recommend
the spatial tasks to the workers in the geocast regions for fulfillment, and it is unnecessary for
the workers to travel to specific regions to perform the spatial tasks for customers. Thereby, the
cost on travel and time for workers are reduced. In addition, the spatial tasks and crowdsourcing
reports are encrypted during transmission to prevent workers’ privacy leakage from them.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize our contributions in this thesis and propose future research.
6.1 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• First, we propose a tendering-based incentive framework for encouraging vehicles to par-
ticipate using their onboard capabilities in the VCC system. Due to fact that modern ve-
hicles have a variety of resources, they can be selected by the VCC server as resource
providers. In order to ensure the fairness among vehicles, we introduce an illustrative
language that is capable of describing heterogeneous vehicular resource types as a novel
approach. In addition, we exploit game theory in order to design a truthful privacy preserv-
ing tendering (TPPT) mechanism that ensures truthful tenders and helps the VCC server
to select the vehicle with optimal resources for the task. The signcryption technique with
the homomorphic concept is used in this work to preserve the truthful information reported
by vehicles from being disclosed. The proposed TPPT scheme is much more efficient and
guarantees the truthful tenders compared with the other popular game theory schemes ap-
plied in VCC [20] [91] [92]. Also, it has been found that, in terms of the communication
and computational overheads, the proposed scheme is significantly more efficient than the
existing schemes.
89
• Second, due to fact that a vehicle’s location privacy is likely to be disclosed during task
announcement, we introduce a new mechanism called MRPRS, which stands for multi-
ple receiver proxy re-signcryption technique. The proposed scheme combines the proxy
re-encryption with multiple receiver signcryption in order to eliminate an increase in com-
putational cost when the number of receivers increase. We use MRPRS as a concealing
mechanism against disclosure of the vehicle’s privacy during task announcement. The
VCC server signcrypts the task in order to conceal the task content from any adversary
or malicious RSU. The RSU re-signcrypts the message without knowing the content of
this task or even the destination. MRPRS shows the efficiency in terms of computational
costs and ciphertext size compared to the other multiple receiver signcryption schemes and
proxy re-encryption schemes. The security analysis shows the MRPRS can resist various
security threats in task announcement in the VCC system.
• Third, inspired by the fact that vehicles privacy can also be disclosed when a VCC server
recommends suitable vehicles for spatial tasks, we propose a novel location privacy-awareness
task recommendation framework (LATE) in spatial crowdsourcing. The proposed scheme
enables the VCC server to recommend spatial tasks to the vehicles in geocast regions of
spatial tasks. The geocast regions of spatial tasks and geographical location of vehicles
cannot be known by the VCC server. However, it can determine whether the vehicles are
located in the geocast regions of spatial tasks. Proxy re-encryptions is used in order to en-
crypt vehicle reports and spatial tasks so as to avoid leakage of privacy for both customers
and vehicles. The security analysis proves that the attacker is unable to learn anything
about the locations of vehicles or even the geocast areas of spatial tasks. In addition, we
demonstrate that LATE is efficient and practical in terms of computational and communi-
cation overhead.
6.2 Future Work
In future work, we plan to carry out the developed framework with the automobile industry to
build VCC applications in real world situations. In addition, the following research topics will
be investigated as a continuation of my Ph.D. work.
• Vehicles in same location may generate identical sensing reports, which result in increased
computational costs and communication overhead that lead to latency. To detect the redun-
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dant copies on intermediates, we need to inspect the report content. However, this solution
will violate vehicle privacy. Using encryption methods can prevent the information from
being disclosed, but the issue is how to detect the reduplicate data while they are encrypted.
• In modern vehicles, the OBU system is responsible for controlling and diagnosing onboard
sensors as well as reporting any problems related to their functionality. However, the OBU
system is considered an entry point to attack the vehicle functionality that may cause a big
damage such as crashing vehicle. To realize the volume of the security threats confronting
vehicles, it is important to know that all the sensor components associated with safety
or non-safety in the vehicle are controlled by the OBU system. Thus, security threats
may originate from connecting to the OBU system port. For example, when a third-party
is physically connected to a vehicle’s OBU system port or non-physically via Bluetooth
or Wi-Fi for diagnostics purpose, it may set up of some auto mobile applications on the
vehicle’s OBU system. Malicious codes or viruses can be installed in the OBU system by
these mobile applications that can leave the vehicle more vulnerable for attacks and result
in affect the vehicle’s functionality, for example, disabling the brakes or turning on all the
lights in the vehicle to drain the battery.
While there is no general solution or scheme for a wide variety of many security and privacy
issues in VCC, we plan to study cryptography and game theory more deeply to determine suitable
and efficient schemes that can address the above challenges in a VCC paradigm.
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